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Worldwide Corporate Convergence
Within A Pluralistic Business Legal
Order: Company Law and the
Independent Director System in
Contemporary China
ByCHI-WEI HUANG1
I. Worldwide Corporate Convergence of Global Non-State
Actors
A. Corporate Legal Regimes of Global Non-State Actors
The blurring of traditional boundaries puts a premium on
creativity and constant vigilance. The corporate ecosystem of the 21st
century is and will continue be characterized by such a blurring of
once distinct boundaries: between public and private, foreign and
domestic, insider and outsider, friend and foe. Corporations are freer
to pursue opportunities to make profits wherever they can be found
in the world and to exploit them according to the requirements of
circumstance, not the blind dictates of tradition. The growing fluidity
of vital business relationships will require constant vigilance and
improvisation by all who are concerned .
The transnational relationships that disregard borders, thus
uniting power at the national and international levels, gradually lead
1. S.J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; Visiting Scholar, University of
Pennsylvania Law School; Adjunct Assistant Professor, Asian Studies Institute, St.
John's University. I am grateful to Professor Jacques deLisle, Professor David
Arthur Skeel, Professor Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.
and Professor Michael L. Wachter of the University of Pennsylvania Law School for
helpful comments; and to the Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation for International
Scholarly Exchange for research funding.
2. Anthony Bianco, The Ecosystem, Bus. WK., Aug. 28, 2000, at 166.
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to the development of one unified capitalist global system. The
global order of such a world consists of various territorial and
functional legal orders that, along with competition or cooperation,
regulate social and economic life. This phenomenon derives from the
fact that they pursue different goals and defend different interests.
De-territorialized legal orders, which allow corporations to purse
their own interests beyond state borders by obtaining production
factors (labor and capital) and by selecting positive normative
environments (such as lenient environmental regulations) when it is
in their best interest to do so, are challenging the equilibrium
historically found within states. They thus challenge the capacity of
the state to serve as a conciliator of divergent interests.
Enterprises contribute to the development of multi-state legal
orders.4 A consistent, cooperating "New Business Order" has been
built globally to deal with the growing fluidity of the new, developing
business world. Taxes and tariffs will largely disappear, worldwide
accounting standards will develop, business and government will form
partnerships to create minimum privacy standards for commercial
transactions, and governments will sign multilateral agreements
delineating acceptable business practices. To comply with the New
Business Order, a "New Pluralistic Business Legal Order"5
developed; it consists of a set of international laws and regulations
which define the type of corporate governance structure presently
agreed by most of the countries in the world to be the most efficient
and profitable system. However, as only some countries conform to
the New Pluralistic Business Legal Order, predictable and
unpredictable conflicts arise.
Corporate governance within this New Pluralistic Business Legal
Order provides a critical mechanism for containing risk, raising
capital externally, and regulating an organization's economic
activities internally. Policy-makers are increasingly aware of the
essential role that good corporate governance plays in improving the
3. Jean-Philippe Rob6, L'entreprise en droit, 29 DROIT ETSOCIETI 117 (1995).
4. Rob'e, Jean-Philippe (1992), Trade and Justice, Florence: Institut
Universitaire European.
5. A new legal order was built up to comply with the new world order; it
appears to be a set of internationalized laws or regulations that were agreed upon by
most of the countries in the world presently. However, in some developing countries
like China, where they are on their way toward fitting in the newly formulated legal
order, there are predictable and unpredictable conflicts with the New Pluralistic
Business Legal Order.
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financial market's stability and in increasing investment incentives
and economic growth within the New Pluralistic Business Legal
Order.
This dissertation will, in Part I, introduce both the dominant
corporate model and corporate ownership structure as well as the
model for the most efficient corporate governance system under the
New Pluralistic Business Legal Order, as promoted by the proponents
of the theory of global convergence of corporate governance. Part II
will argue how this phenomenon impacts China's corporate
governance system during its ongoing economic and legal reforms,
identify the path dependencies and other problems the Chinese
corporate governance system has been encountering, and suggest
measures to address these problems. Part III will conclude by
exploring why the path dependencies are harder to overcome in
China, a "rule of man" country, than in other "rule of law" countries.
B. Worldwide Corporate Governance Convergence
According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD)'s6 findings in its "Principles of Corporate
Governance, ' "an effective corporate governance framework should
promote transparent and efficient markets, be consistent with the rule
of law, and clearly articulate the division of responsibilities among
different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities."
These principles have provided extensive guidance for legislative and
regulatory initiatives for countries with shareholder-oriented
8
corporate forms, for countries with stakeholder-oriented corporate
forms, and for countries with the concentrated or the dispersed
ownership model.
6. The Convention of the OECD was signed in Paris on December 14, 1960, and
came into force on September 30, 1961. The member countries include without
limitation France, Germany, Japan, Korea and the United States.
7. The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance were endorsed by OECD
Ministries in 1999 and have since become an international milestone for parties
involved in corporate governance.
8. In common law systems like the U.K. and U.S., the corporate governance
forms focus on shareholders' interests rather than stakeholders' interests. The
corporate governance forms in common law systems are regarded as "shareholder-
oriented."
9. In civil law systems like China, Germany, Japan, and Taiwan, the corporate
governance forms focus on stakeholders' interests rather than shareholders' interests.
The corporate governance forms in civil law systems are regarded as "stakeholder-
oriented."
20081
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L Dominant Corporate Forms
Institutional differences in the essence of corporate governance,
capital markets, and law exist around the globe. Since the purposes
of corporate governance in the civil law and common law systems are
different, '° shareholder-oriented forms and stakeholder-oriented
forms have developed accordingly.1
Various jurisdictions have defined the core functional features of
the corporate form, widely accepted by large-scale worldwide
companies, as the following: "(1) full legal personality, including well-
defined authority to bind the firm to contracts and to bond those
contracts with assets that are the property of the firm, as distinct from
the firm's owners;'2 (2) limited liability for owners and managers; (3)
shared ownership by investors of capital; (4) delegated management
under a board structure; and (5) transferable shares."'3  Such
characteristics "both individually and in combination, offer important
efficiencies in organizing large firms with multiple owners that have
come to dominate developed market economies. ,1 4  Protecting
shareholder interests rather than the interests of stakeholders, like
creditors, laborers, and consumers, became the major underlying
reason for the implementation of the above-mentioned five
characteristics of the corporate form. "Shareholder-oriented" form
has thus prevailed over "stakeholders-oriented" form.
After years of experimenting, the "standard shareholder-
oriented model" introduced and refined by scholars, businessmen,
and government authorities has formalized. The primary elements of
this consensus are: (1) the shareholder class should hold the ultimate
control of the corporation; (2) when managers of the corporation
make decisions, they should consider shareholder interests first; (3)
10. Richard Smerdon: A practical Guide to Corporate Governance, 3-7, Sweet &
Maxwell, 1998.
11. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Company Structure in Germany,
Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993); Bernard S. Black & John C.
Coffee, Jr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited
Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1997 (1994); Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe,
Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance
and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871 (1993).
12. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000).
13. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439,439-40 (2001).
14. Id. at 440.
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non-controlling shareholders' rights are well protected against
exploitation by the controlling shareholders; (4) the interests of
creditors, employees, and consumers should be protected by
contractual or regulatory means; and (5) shareholders' interests are
primarily based on the market value of the shares of public
corporations. 15 The share value will increase if a firm places all its
shareholders' interests above the interests of labor, politicians,
management, or those of only the controlling shareholders.'6
A Dominant Corporate Ownership Models
When the boundaries of territories become vague, competition is
created among companies by the interplay of various corporate
governance regimes.'7 The basic corporate ownership structures
influence which economic and legal environments corporate
governance regimes will provide the greatest advantages for their
domestic companies. The two major models of corporate ownership
are "dispersed-ownership" and "concentrated ownership, "which are
often the major competitors in the market of corporate governance
regimes.18
The dispersed-ownership model is characterized by a diffused
body of corporate ownership; whereas the concentrated-ownership
model is characterized by a centralized body of corporate ownership.
The dispersed-ownership model is generally accompanied by a
stronger securities market than the concentrated ownership model.
The securities markets in the dispersed-ownership model are also
15. Id. at 441.
16. See Christopher John Gulinello, The Revision of Taiwan's Company Law
The Struggle Toward a Shareholder-Oriented Model in One Corner of East Asia, 28
Del. J. Corp. L. 75, 85 (2004).
17. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global
Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 641,
642 (1999); Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance. Convergence of
Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 336 (2001).
18. Id; See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer,
Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 471-72 (1999) (surveying
concentrated ownership and dispersed-ownership countries); see also Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership
and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 129 (1999) (suggesting that some countries
have a diffuse body of ownership and some have concentrated ownership); Amir N.
Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of
Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147, 149 (2001) (questioning
why companies in some countries have dispersed ownership and in other countries
concentrated ownership).
2008]
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equipped with more adequate shareholder protection measures than
those provided in the concentrated-ownership model. Scholars have
found that dispersed ownership mostly exists in common-law systems
since they are able to provide adequate protections to minority
shareholders. 9  The concentrated-ownership model generally is
accompanied by weaker securities markets than the dispersed
ownership model, however its typically strong bank systems and other
professional institutions play a crucial supporting role in maintaining
the healthy operation of the market." The companies in
concentrated-ownership models greatly depend on the banks to
provide them necessary capital.2'
The depth and liquidity of equity markets around the world is
commonly attributed to common-law systems consistently
outperforming civil-law system.22 If the finding is correct, it is not
hard to imagine that civil-law countries are tempted to adopt rules of
common-law legal systems to disperse their ownership structures to
develop deeper and more liquid securities markets. 3
C Worldwide Convergence Toward Shareholder-
Oriented/Dispersed Ownership
i. Shareholder-Oriented/Dispersed Ownership
The prevalent trend across developed market jurisdictions has
been a convergence toward a single, standard corporate structure.
The essential legal features of the shareholder-oriented ideology are
well established among developed market jurisdictions and noticeably
dominate the development of worldwide corporate forms. A model
that strives to increase long-term shareholder value has become the
most competitive corporate governance theory among developed
economies. '4 As shareholders' values are attracting the spotlight,
established legal measures to protect shareholders' rights have
become an important indicator of a healthy and appealing corporate
governance system. A series of examinations of worldwide corporate
governance and ownership structures have concluded that there is a
19. See Coffee, supra note 18, at 642-43.
20. Id
21. Id. at 643.
22. Id. at 644.
23. Id. at 645.
24. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 14, at 439.
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correlation among adequate legal protection of shareholders,
dispersion of ownership, and strong securities markets. 5 Several
empirical studies suggest that a shareholder-oriented corporate
body,26 with adequate legal protection for minority shareholders,27 will
disperse its ownership structure and that this dispersed ownership
structure will be able to generate more value in an equity market.2
A Overarching Opinions
Opponents of the theory of global convergence of corporate
governance argue that worldwide corporate governance regimes are
not necessarily converging toward dispersed-ownership and
shareholder-oriented models; they also doubt whether the
globalization convergence process reflects U.S.-centric chauvinism. 9
Some also hold suspicions about the superiority of the efficiency of
the shareholder-oriented/dispersed ownership model. One of the
weaknesses of the shareholder-oriented/dispersed ownership model is
the model's overemphasis on shareholders' interests. This bias
encourages management to focus on grabbing short-term gains for
shareholders rather than focusing on a long-term plan for the
company. This management prejudice is especially easy to observe
when management levels consider merger and acquisition offers.30 In
addition, the relatively decentralized ownership structure suggests
that enterprises following the shareholder-oriented/dispersed
ownership model may have an inferior ability to audit the
performance of managers than those following the concentrated
ownership model.3
25. See La Porta et al., supra note 19, at 511-13; Rafael La Porta et al., Legal
Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1149 (1997); Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON.
1113, 1152 (1998).
26. "Shareholder-oriented" model refers to a model whose primary goal is to
maximize the shareholders' interests to protect shareholders' rights.
27. "A shareholder who owns less than half the total shares outstanding and thus
cannot control the corporation's management or single-handedly elect directors."
Black's La w Dictionary 1408 (8th ed. 2004).
28. La Porta et al., supra note 19, at 512 (stating that designing an adequate legal
system to protect minority shareholders' interests will enhance the effect of
dispersion of ownership).
29. Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of "Global" Convergence
in Corporate Governance, 34 Cornell Int'l L.J. 321, 350 (2001).
30. Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. Pol. Econ.
61, 62 (1988).
31. JEREMY EDWARDS & KLAUS FISCHER, BANKS, FINANCE, AND INVESTMENT IN
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Although there are debates on whether a global convergence
toward the shareholder oriented/dispersed ownership model exists,
there is nevertheless a worldwide tendency of countries to design
corporate governance systems that can better protect minority
shareholders as a way to create strong securities markets. Regardless
of the degree of controlling shareholder opposition, minority
shareholder constituencies will ultimately grow to "create" relatively
stronger "lobby forces" for formal legal protections.32 A jurisdiction
that adopts optimal legal protections for minority shareholders will
help its domestic companies become more competitive in the global
capital market. Equity markets develop more broadly and the value
of such markets increases in countries with adequate minority
shareholder protection.33 Alternatively, some scholars argue that the
sequence may be reversed based on the examination of the early
development of the New York Stock Exchange and the London Stock
Exchange 4  They assert that in the late 19th century, dispersed
ownership arose largely in the absence of strong minority shareholder
protection. They also affirm that the constituency (here, minority,
dispersed public shareholders) first arose before they could become
an effective lobbying force, and then subsequently demanded legal
reforms.35 Although views on the relevance of shareholder protection
may differ, "the direction of causation" a dispersed ownership
structure and a shareholder-oriented corporate law model are widely
considered to be the best combination for corporate governance.
However, other scholars have argued that the inability to provide
adequate legal protection to minority shareholders in civil-law
systems leads to the development of dispersed ownership structures.36
Most companies would prefer to rely on more efficient access to
venture capital markets, provided by strong securities markets in a
dispersed ownership model, rather than borrow their capital from
GERMANY (1994). See also COFFEE, supra note 18, at 661-62.
32. La Porta et al., supra note 19, at 513 (stating how legal changes are
implemented due to the lobby from the minority shareholders).
33. Id. at 511.
34. Id.
35. John C. Coffee, Jr., Convergence and Its Critics: What are the Preconditions
to the Separation of Ownership and Control? 8 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 179, 2000), at <http://www.law.columbia.edu/center-
program/law economics/wplistingl> (last visited Sept. 11, 2007).
36. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and
the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2001).
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stable resources, such as banks, in a concentrated ownership system. 7
A competitive corporate legal system must be able to connect to the
global securities markets in order to develop limitless possibilities for
their domestic companies to access the capital they need." That most
large-scale international companies list on more mature securities
markets proves the dispersed ownership model emerges victorious
over the concentrated ownership model.
D. Obstacles to Worldwide Corporate Governance - Path
Dependencies
Scholars constantly argue that the power of "path dependency"
creates an obstacle as jurisdictions prepare themselves to converge
toward the shareholder-oriented/dispersed ownership model.3 9 Even
if we assume that market forces urge the predominance of the
shareholder-oriented/dispersed ownership model, certain path-
dependent forces might serve as strong obstacles in spite of market
pressure."° There is a great deal of scholarship categorizing path
dependencies into different types, based on different concerns and
perspectives. The author will categorize path dependencies, based on
the benefiting party, into two types,: (1) path dependency driven by
efficiency for the firm's overall benefit; and (2); path dependency
driven by "rent-protection" or "rent-seeking,"4 1 for certain interest
groups' benefit.
i. Efficiency-Driven Path Dependency
The effects of path dependency and the history of corporate
transformation suggest that the existing legal and extra-legal
institutions in a jurisdiction, on both a national level and a firm level,
affect the adoption of the subsequent corporate legal structure.3
37. Coffee, supra note 36.
38. Coffee, supra note 18, at 641 (introducing assumption by Berle and Mean that
large-scale industries can only raise capital from accomplished securities markets
with dispersed ownership); see also 649 (stating that stronger legal protection of
minority shareholders implies higher stock prices).
39. The two major representing scholars are Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Mark
Roe.
40. Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 19, at 131-32 (suggesting that path dependencies
could not be removed by market forces).
41. 1-3 Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations §
3.05, commentary(American Law Institute 2005).
42. Id. at 137-42 (addressing the efficiencies and corporate structures gained by
2008]
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Efficiency is the first reason to be concerned. The development of
ownership structures relies on the pattern of what the jurisdiction had
at earlier points in time. 3 To make maximum profits without wasting
time or resources, or to avoid the risks leading to any possible losses,
firms might retain their original structures in consideration of
efficiency under the following circumstances: (1) "sunk adaptive
costs," i.e., once costs are sunk in the existing legal structure without
any better alternatives, maintaining and continuing them is often
efficient;' (2) "complementarities," in which costs are sunk in the
professional institutions which are developed to facilitate the
operations of the corporate structure and to maintain and continue
them is often efficient;45 (3) "network externalities," in which major
ownership structures of other companies in the same jurisdiction will
influence a firm's decision on choosing its own ownership model;46 (4)
"endowment effects," in which players who have control over an
existing structure may affect the total value that alternative structures
would produce due to their valuation of having such control;47 or (5)
"multiple optima." 48 Any of the above circumstances could cause a
company to hesitate in changing its current ownership structure.
Firms prefer to maintain the status quo since any change of the
ownership structure might cause unexpected, additional transaction
costs. They would rather maintain their original structure, which
provides the identity of efficient ownership structure. The
consideration of path dependency is for the firm's overall benefit.
i Rent-Protection'Driven Path Dependency
In addition to the efficiency considerations listed above, the
other major consideration relating to a firm retaining an existing
development around these structures); Id at 153-57 (discussing corporate rules and
efficiencies gained by development around these rules).
43. Id at 137-139.
44. Id. at 139.
45. Id. at 140.
46. Id at 141.; See also Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in
Corporate Contracting" Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74
WASH. L. Q. 347, 350-53 (discussing learning and network externalities in corporate
contracts); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 562-86 (1998) (stating the network
externalities will lead to appropriate amendments of internal corporate rules).
47. Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 19, at 141.
48. Id at 142.
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structure is "rent-protection," or "rent-seeking." 9  Efficiency
consideration is viewed from the perspective of the firm's overall
benefit, whereas the rent-protection consideration focuses on the
interests of a certain group of people in a firm. These groups of
people control the decision-making power of the firm and extract
private benefit from their positions. They are not only reluctant to
change the status quo, but also try to create certain corporate rules
favoring their individual interests in the firm.
The corporate rules which set up the legal structure of a
company influence all aspects of a company's operation. ° Once the
corporate rules are adopted, firms suffer great transaction costs if
they make changes in their corporate ownership models. This will
then increase the difficulty of making changes and encourage the firm
to stay on its current path."
iil. Solutions
The efficiency consideration of firm-wide benefits and the rent-
protection consideration of certain groups' benefits serve as strong
obstacles for jurisdictions intending to convert to another corporate
form. Relevant literature suggests that the transformation of legal
systems on a functional level rather than a formal level would make it
easier to avoid the struggle with path dependency and create a better
climate for corporate governance convergence to thrive. 2 Such
scholars suggest that self-regulation is frequently the primary
functional substitute to mandatory legal regulation, since self-
regulation can encourage and support business activities that formal
legal systems cannot. 3
In addition, there are two other suggestions to persuade rent-
protected controlling shareholders to take legal measures to protect
49. Quoted from Professor David Skeel's explanation, "In economies, a "rent" is
a supracompetitive profit - more profit than in a competitive market. In the
corporate context, scholars use the term to refer to the fact that controlling
shareholders may be able to use their control to secure private benefits for
themselves from the corporation (such as a high salary, or a lucrative contract with
the corporation).
50. Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 19, at 139 (stating that the corporate rule could
be able to decide which ownership structure to adopt, with or without controlling
shareholders).
51. Id. at 142.
52. Gilson, supra note 18, at 338 (suggesting that convergence on functional level
will be an effective alternative while convergence on formal level is too costly).
53. Coffee, supra note 18.
2008]
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minority shareholders: (1) increasing the protective measures for
minority shareholders will increase their own wealth and that this
increase will be more valuable than their private benefit of control,54
i.e., the earnings from the reduced capital costs induced by the new
rules will exceed their private benefits of control; and (2) those legal
measures would protect their rights once they become minority
shareholders.55
E. The Chinese Puzzle
Recently, some have argued that strong securities markets and
dispersed ownership are unlikely to develop in civil law countries
(such as China) for the following three major reasons: (1) the lack of
adequate minority legal protection, (2) the incapability of public
shareholders to hold control, and (3) the political susceptibility of
diffuse ownership in "social democracies. 5 6  However, opponents
have found that dispersed ownership has arisen in civil law countries
in Europe. 7 Some scholars even argue that the whole world is
converging. China may be an exception since its economic
achievements do not result from the certainty brought by a clear and
definite legal system to support a shareholder-oriented/dispersed
ownership model, but from the planned commands brought by its
autonomous government.58 However, is China, a self-described
"socialist market economy,"59 moving toward the shareholder-
oriented/dispersed ownership model to attract more foreign capital?
54. Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 19, at 130, 142-47 (explaining why some countries
have dispersed ownership, but others do not; describing also the reason for
controlling shareholders to insist to have the shares dispersed is that they are afraid
of the possibility of losing their rents and not being able to take advantage of the gain
created by the efficiency); Coffee, supra note 18, at 654; Hansmann & Kraakman,
supra note 14 (suggesting that the shareholder-oriented model not only benefits
controlling shareholders, but also benefits minority shareholders); La Porta et al.,
supra note 19.
55. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership." The Role of Law and
the State in Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L. J. 1 (2001)(suggesting
that most scholars that adequate protection of minority shareholders is the base of an
efficient securities markets); at 33 ("stating how discussing how mergers of large
corporations raised capitalization beyond the means of corporate raiders and, thus
created more stable dispersed ownership.").
56. Gilson, supra note 18, at 338.
57. Coffee, supra note 55.
58. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 451
(2002).
59. Article I of the CCL.
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IL. China's Convergence with Worldwide Corporate
Governance
There is, surely, more than one route for China's economic
development. The essential key to economic development is the
formation of an institutional structure derived from the individual
country's cultural institutions that supply appropriate incentives for
growth, rather than to adopt a complete set of Western institutions.'
Although individual countries face new and different problems as
their economies develop, the fundamental elements of developed
economies are identical. The secret to developing a healthy economy
is to selectively adopt efficient institutions from established
economies. 6' As what we have concluded in Part I, most of the
established economies adopt the shareholder-oriented/dispersed
ownership model. But how does this apply to China? How has China
responded to the pressures of globalization? China is a country that
has not yet installed clearly defined property rights and is still under
the control of a communist dictatorship. 62 However, the apparent
deficiencies in the Chinese investment environment have hardly
stopped its rapid economic growth in the past two decades. Some
scholars believe that there could not be a meaningful encounter
between the Chinese tradition and Western systems of law.6
Currently existing economic and political models to not apply well to
China.64  Two features stand out while discussing the Chinese
experience: "(1) While the institutions China employed are different
from developed nations, the incentive implications were similar; and
(2) China has been confronting new problems and pragmatically
attempting new solutions., 61 Is China converging toward the
60. "Institutions" here refer to how human interactions (e.g., political, social and
economic) are structured, as well as prevailing social frameworks. The institutions
may be made up of formal rules (enactment of laws), informal constraints (norms,
conventions and codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics.
61. Id.
62. Douglass C. North, The Chinese Menu (for Development), WALL ST. J., Apr.
7, 2005, at A14.
63. See generally Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship:
Comparative Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 Stan. L.
Rev. 1599 (2000).
64. North, supra note 59, at A14.
65. Id
20081
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shareholder-oriented/dispersed ownership model? What legal
institutions has China employed? What historical and infrastructural
factors have shaped and influenced the institutions in China? What
solutions has China introduced to transform itself? And finally, what
can China do to solve the problems it faces in reforming corporate
governance structure? Part II elaborates on this discussion.
A. Corporate Legal Regime of China - Company Law in China
i. General Information
a. Evolutionary History
Some permutation of a company law has been on the books in
China since 1904.' Several enactments came up in 1914
(Republican), 1929 (Nationalist), 1946 (Nationalist) and 1994
(Communist). The 1994 Company Law (hereinafter "CCL") was an
important milestone for corporate China. The most significant goal
of the CCL was to restructure the organization and management of
State-Owned Enterprises ("SOE").
The CCL superseded provisional corporate regulations of the
central government and the regulations of two municipalities. There
were originally 11 Chapters and 230 Articles in the 1994 CCL. On
October 27, 2005, the 18th Plenum of the 10th Chinese National
People's Congress passed an amendment of the CCL. Due to such
amendment, which took effect on January 1, 2006, the CCL currently
contains 13 Chapters and 219 Articles. On the same date, in the same
meeting, the Chinese National People's Congress also passed an
amendment of PRC's Securities Law, which is now comprised of 12
Chapters and 240 Articles.
b. Forms of Companies
There are two forms of companies in the CCL: the "limited
liability company" and the "company limited by shares" (also known
as a joint stock company). This distinction corresponds roughly to the
British models of the private company and the public company 67 or
66. It was in the Qing Dynasty in ancient China.
67. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, Special Problems of Closely-
Held Corporations, in LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINEss ENTERPRISES
704 (3d student ed. 1983); see also Colin McFadyean, The American Close
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the American model of the closely held corporation and the publicly
held corporation. 68 Limited liability companies are normally smaller
corporations, as it is required that the number of their shareholders
does not exceed fifty.' According to Article 20 of the 1994 CCL, "a
limited liability company is allowed to have only one shareholder if
the shareholder is the state." In the newest version of CCL, the
above stipulation was eliminated. The definition of a wholly state-
owned enterprise is found only in Article 65 of the 2006 CCL.7 °
As opposed to the limited liability company, the company limited
by shares must have more than two but less than two hundred
shareholders.71 Companies limited by shares are allowed to issue
their shares in public securities markets according to Article 121 of
CCL, and Articles 12 and 13 of Securities Law.
The concept of "limited liability" is a fundamental concept in
Western company law but is a relatively new idea to corporate China.
The Chinese CCL regulators adopted principles of limited liability for
corporate parallelism to Western systems, particularly the United
States. The CCL stipulates that both of the legitimate company forms
enjoy limited liability whereby the liability of shareholders is limited
to the amount to which each shareholder has subscribed.72 The 1994
CCL did not contain reference to the idea of "piercing the corporate
veil or restrictions on shareholders' limited liability immunity.74
However, the 2006 CCL amendment incorporates the "piercing the
Corporation and its British Equivalent, 14 Bus. Law. 215 (1958).
68. See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, Distinctive Needs of Close
Corporations and other Closely Held Businesses, in ONEAL AND THOMPSON'S
CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCs: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:1 (3d ed. 2004).
69. According to Article 24 of the CCL, a limited liability company shall be
jointly incorporated by no more than fifty shareholders.
70. According to Article 65 of the CCL, "The term 'solely state-owned company'
as mentioned in this law refers to a limited liability company established through
investment solely by the state, for which the State Council or the local people's
government authorizes the state-owned assets supervision and administration
institution of the people's government at the same level to perform the functions of
the capital contributors."
71. Refer to Article 79 of the CCL.
72. See Wei Yaorong, The Regulatory Framework of China's Company Law, in
COMMERCIAL LAWS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 30-46 (Bryan S. Bachner
& H.L. Fu eds., 1995).
73. A judicial act which imposes personal liability on otherwise immune
corporate officers, directors, and shareholders for the corporation's certain unlawful
behaviors. See Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source, 993 F.2d 1309, 1311 (7th
Cir. 1993).
74. Gu, supra note 81, at 11.
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corporate veil" concept into Article 20. According to Article 20 of
2006 CCL, "[c]ompany shareholders who damage company or other
shareholders' rights by abusing their own rights shall be liable for the
loss in accordance with the laws."
c. Incorporation of Companies
The government's operative attitude toward the incorporation of
companies is highly regulatory and controlling. Companies need to
fulfill the conditions set forth in either Article 23 (limited liability
companies)75 or Article 77 (companies limited by shares)76 to
incorporate in China. To establish a limited liability company, the
entity must apply for incorporation registration by submitting a
company registration application, along with the articles of
incorporation and the capital verification certificate to the company
registration authority to apply.7 To establish a company limited by
shares, the entity must submit a registration application, along with
the promoters' meeting minutes, the articles of incorporation, the
capital verification certificate, the office documents and identification
evidence of legal representatives, directors and supervisors, the proof
of legal person qualification or natural person identification of
promoters, and proof of company's residence to the company
registration authority within thirty days of the promoters' meeting.78
Although the Chinese regulators have simplified the incorporation
75. The conditions of Article 23 of the Company Law of the People's Republic of
China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Eighth Nat'l People's Cong., Dec.
29, 1993. Amended 2005) are: "(1) The number of shareholders accords with the
quorum; (2) The amount of capital contributions paid by the shareholders reaches
the statutory minimum amount of the registered capital; (3) The articles of
association are worked out jointly by shareholders; (4) The company has a name and
its organizational structure complies with that of a limited liability company; and (5)
The company has a domicile."
76. The content of Article 77 is very similar to Article 23, it just carries some
more shareholding characteristics. Article 73 of CCL requires, "(1) The number of
initiators meets the quorum; (2) The capital stock subscribed for and raised by the
initiators reaches the minimum amount of the statutory capital; (3) The issuance of
shares and the preparatory work accord with the provisions of the law; (4) The
articles of association are formulated by the initiators, and are adopted at the
establishment meeting if the company is to be launched by stock floatation; (5) The
company has a name, and its organizational structure accords with that of a joint
stock limited company (6) The company has a domicile."
77. See Article 30 of the CCL.
78. See Article 93 of the CCL.
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process in the newest amendment,79 this relatively strict incorporation
procedure is similar to the extraordinary requirements found in
England and the U.S. until the early 1800's.80
d. Major Players in Chinese Corporate Governance
Except for wholly state-owned companies, which may operate
differently from privately owned companies,8' the "shareholders," the
"board of directors," and the "board of supervisors" are the three key
actors on the stage of Chinese corporate governance. People may
argue that the Chinese corporate governance structure is identical to
Germany's two-tier system, since both are equipped with a board of
director and a board of supervisors.82  However, the practical
79. According to Article 19 and Article 73 of the 1994 CCL, the incorporation
applications need to be approved first by the State Council or certain provincial
governments before submitting the application for the company's registration.
80. See NORMAN LATTIN, Evolution of Anglo-American Corporations; Origin of
the "Concession" Theory, in THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 54, at 174-76 (2d ed.
1971) (explaining that before the early 1800s, corporate organization limited liability
was deemed a special privilege that was merely granted to business entities with
distinct connection to industries related to public welfare, such as railroads, banks, or
traders with foreign lands. Those requirements were viewed to unfairly benefit the
rich and powerful as the Jacksonian populists sprang up. The "general corporation
acts" which allowed the incorporation process become inexpensive and kept several
basic filing requirements approachable to ordinary people was released accordingly.
Really comprehensive "general corporation acts" came between the last quarter of
the 19th century and the first quarter of the 20th. The Pennsylvania act was enacted
in 1874, the New Jersey act or revision in 1896, the Delaware statute was completely
overhauled in 1967 with amendments in 1968 and 1969. Many statutes drew
suggestions from The Model Corporation Act of 1928).
81. Pursuant to Article 67 of the CCL, "A solely state-owned company shall not
set up the shareholders' meeting, and the functions of the shareholders' meeting shall
be exercised by the state-owned assets supervision and administration institution.
The state-owned assets supervision and administration institution may authorize the
board of directors of the company to exercise some of the functions of the
shareholders' meeting and decide on important matters of the company, excluding
those that must be decided by the state-owned assets supervision and administration
such as merger, split-up, dissolution of the company, increase or decrease of
registered capital as well as the issuance of corporate bonds. The merger, split-up,
dissolution or application for bankruptcy of an important solely state-owned
company shall be subject to the examination of the state-owned assets supervision
and administration institution, and then be reported to the people's government at
the same level for approval."
82. Aktiengesetz [German Stock Company Act] 84, 1965; Thomas J. Andre, Jr.,
Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance: A Glimpse at German
Supervisory Boards, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 1819, 1823 (1996); Susan-Jacqueline Butler,
Models of Modern Corporations: A Comparative Analysis of German and US
Corporate Structures, 17 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 555 (2000); David Charny, The
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positions of a supervisory board in China and Germany are very
different. In Germany, the supervisory boards are on the top of a
hierarchical system, they oversee the board of directors, and have the
power to appoint and dismiss directors.83 In contrast, in China,
although the newest amendments grant supervisory boards more
power to supervise the board of directors, the supervisory boards are
not situated in a higher position than the board of directors. Both the
board of directors and the supervisory board are appointed and may
be dismissed by shareholders. 84
ii Shareholders
a. Powers
China, a civil-law country, defines "corporate governance" as a
system to efficiently regulate relationships among all interested
parties in a business organization, such as creditors, consumers, and
business partners. However, due to the influence of Anglo-American
corporate governance concepts, "shareholders" have been singled out
as a particularly important group. Shareholders are considered the
organ of supreme sovereign power of the corporation.85 Shareholders
hold the following comprehensive decision-making powers according
to Article 38 of the 2006 CCL: they (1) determine the company's
business policy and investment plan; (2) elect and change directors
and supervisors who are not employee representatives and decide
related matters regarding their remunerations; (3) review and
approve the reports from board of directors; (4) review and approve
the reports from the board of directors or supervisors; (5) review and
approve the company's annual financial budget plan and financial
account plan; (6) review and approve plans regarding profit
distribution and loss recovery proposals; (7) decide whether to
increase or reduce the company's registered capital; (8) decide
whether to issue company bonds; (9) make decisions on general
German Corporate Governance System, 1998 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 145 (1998).
83. Aktiengesetz; Bulter, supra note 79, at 602; Andre, Jr. supra note 79, at 1823-
1824; See also Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and Accountability of the
Corporation in Contemporary Society. Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62
Law & Contemp. Probs. 9, 52-53 (1999); Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani,
Corporate Governance in a Global Environment: The Search for the Best of All
Worlds, 33 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 852 (2000).
84. According to Article 38 and Article 103 of the CCL.
85. Articles 37 and 99 of the CCL.
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corporate form, e.g. whether to merge, split, or transform company
forms, or to dissolve or liquidate; (10) amend the company's articles
of incorporation; and (11) pursue other powers which are stipulated
in the articles of association. 6 Although some of the above powers
resemble shareholders' rights in the United States, ' other powers,
such as the powers "to approve plans on corporate profit distribution
and loss recovery proposals," "to determine the directors'
remuneration," and "to make resolutions on plans of bonds
issuance," are reserved to the board of directors in the United
States.88 It thus appears that the general meeting of shareholders has
the power to make many managerial decisions. This institutional
arrangement may work well in relatively small-scale limited liability
companies with fewer shareholders. However, it may be an
inefficient corporate structure mechanism for publicly held
corporations which have to respond rapidly to a competitive and
changeable market.
b. Rights
In addition to the managerial powers, the 2006 CCL amendment
has granted shareholders the right to bring lawsuits under certain
circumstances. Shareholders may initiate lawsuits with a resolution of
a shareholders' general meeting or when the board of directors
violates the law, administrative rules and regulations, or infringes
upon the shareholders' rights. 89 In addition to the above right to sue,
which was adopted from the 1994 CCL, the 2006 CCL enlarged the
range of shareholder rights to sue. For example, shareholders may
now bring suit when shareholders and the company cannot reach an
agreement to buy back shares held by the shareholders under certain
circumstances.' Further, shareholders may bring shareholders'
86. Article 38 of the CCL.
87. See, e.g., Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act §§ 7.01 (annual meeting), 7.02
(special meeting), 7.21 (voting entitlement of shares), 7.28 (voting for directors), 8.08
(removal of directors by shareholders), 8.11 (compensation of directors), 10.03
(amendments by board of directors and shareholders), 11.03 (action on plan), 14.02
(dissolution by board of directors and shareholders), 16.02 (inspection of records by
shareholders).
88. Id. §§ 8.01 (b) (general corporate power under the discretion of board of
directors), 6.21 (issuance of shares), 6.40 (distribution to shareholders).
89. Refer to Article 22 of the 2006 CCL amendments. The same content can be
found in Article 111 of the 1994 CCL.
90. Refer to Article 75 of the 2006 CCL amendments.
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derivative suits, analogous to the shareholders' derivative rights suits
under the U.S. corporate governance system. According to Article
152 of the 2006 CCL amendment, "directors, supervisors, high-level
managers or other people that infringe on the company's benefits and
other directors or supervisors that remain quiet during such
infringement, the shareholders are eligible to initiate a lawsuit in his
or her own name for the benefit of the company." This legislation
also grants shareholders the direct right to sue when their legal
interests are invaded by directors or high-level managers."
iii. Directors
a. Oualifications
Like the 1994 CCL, the 2006 CCL amendments restrict who can
be directors either in limited liability companies or in companies
limited by shares. Those limitations are found in Article 147, which
prevents the following people from becoming directors: (1) a person
without legal capacity or with restricted capacity for civil acts; (2) a
person sentenced to certain criminal punishments or deprived of his
or her political rights for committing crimes of bribery, invading
others' properties, or destroying the communist market economic
order when no more than five years have elapsed since the
enforcement dates; (3) a person who is the director, factory president,
or manager of a bankrupt company due to his or her failure in
management and was personally liable for the company's bankruptcy,
when not more than three years have elapsed since the date of the
bankruptcy; (4) a person who is a legal representative of a company
or enterprise whose business license was revoked due to a violation of
the law and was personally liable for such revocation, when not more
than three years have elapsed since the date of the revocation of the
business license; and (5) a person with a relatively large amount debt
due but not yet paid off.
Two other differences between the 1994 and 2006 CCLs are
worth noting. Article 58 of the 1994 CCL stipulated that government
officials cannot be directors, supervisors or managers of companies,
but there is no similar condition quoted in the 2006 CCL
91. Refer to Article 153 of the 2006 CCL amendments and Article 47 of PRC's
Securities Law.
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amendment. 92 In the 1994 CCL, there was no requirement for
independent directors in publicly held corporations. However,
Article 123 of the 2006 CCL amendments clearly stipulates the need
for listed companies to install independent directors, but leaves
further definition and decisions to the State Council.
b. Powers
Pursuant to Article 45 of the 2006 CCL amendment, the board of
directors of a limited liability company shall be composed of three to
thirteen members and may contain several employee representatives.
Pursuant to Article 109 of the 2006 CCL amendment, the board of
directors of a company limited by shares shall be composed of 5 to 19
members and may contain several employee representatives. Should
a limited liability company be invested in or established by two or
more SOEs or two or more other state-owned investment entities, it
shall include employee representatives on their board.93
The board of directors shall be responsible for the shareholders'
meeting and shall exercise the following powers: (1) convene
shareholders' meetings and report its work to the shareholders'
meetings; (2) implement the shareholders' meetings' resolutions; (3)
determine the company's business plan and investment proposals; (4)
formulate the company's annual financial budget plan and financial
proposals; (5) formulate the company's profit distribution plan and
loss recovery proposals; (6) formulate the company's plan to increase
or reduce the registered capital and issue company bonds; (7) propose
the company's merger, splitting, transformation and dissolution plans;
(8) determine how to install the company's internal management
mechanism; (9) hire or fire the company's manager, and hire or fire
the company's deputy manager or the responsible person for the
company's financial matters upon the recommendation of the
manager, and determine their compensation; (10) formulate the
company's basic management system; (11) and other powers granted
in articles of incorporation ." As such, the board of directors does not
92. Xuehai Huang and Shaochun Wang, Oiye Fa GongsiFa Anlifingxuan Jingxi
[Selected Cases and Analysis in Enterprise Law and Company LauS, Beijing: Falu
chubanshe Law Publishing, (1998) (finding the four directors of a wholly state-owned
limited liability company consists of four were all government officials).
93. Refer to Article 45 of the CCL.
94. Refer to Article 47 (limited liability company) and Article 109 (company
limited by shares) of the CCL.
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seem to possess independent discretionary power, rather its powers
are mostly to "implement" shareholders' meetings' resolutions,
"formulate" and "propose" plans for shareholders' meetings'
approval, and "report" to the shareholders. This legislation is much
different from the U.S. Model Business Corporation Act, which
requires that "all corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the
authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed
under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation
set forth in the articles of incorporation." 95
In addition to the overall differences between Chinese boards of
directors and the U.S. director system, there also exist some trivial
distinctions. For example, the CCL sets the minimum and maximum
number of board directors, sets a maximum term of three years for
directors,96 and allows absent directors to vote by proxy.' On the
other hand, the U.S. Model Business Corporation Act sets no
concrete standards on the number of directors,98 sets a maximum term
of one year for directors,9 and does not allow absent directors to vote
by proxy."00
iv. Duties
According to Article 63 of the 1994 CCL, directors, supervisors,
or managers shall be liable for monetary damages if they violate laws,
administrative rules, or provisions in the articles of incorporation
while performing their duties and which thereby cause harm to the
company. It is far from clear whether the 1994 CCL has imposed any
duty of care on directors.10' However, the 1994 legislation does speak
of a duty of loyalty for directors and introduces several related
principles. 2 Supporting provisions can be found in article 59 of the
1994 CCL: "directors and managers shall faithfully exercise their
95. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.01(b) (1984) (incorporating changes through Nov.
2004).
96. Articles 46 and 109 of the CCL.
97. Article 107 of the CCL.
98. Supra note 93, at § 8.03.
99. Id. at § 8.05.
100. Id. at § 8.20.
101. Jianlin Ni, Gudonghuiyu Dongshihui Zhi Liyi Zhiheng[ The Profit Balancing
Between Shareholder Meetings and Board of Directors], GONGS! ZHILI JIEGOU: FALl
YU SHMAN [CORP. GOVERNANCE STRUCrURE: LAW & PRAC.], 70 (Dec. 2001) (Chi-
Wei Huang trans.) (translation on file with author).
102. Id. at 82.
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duties and shall not take advantage of their status and powers to look
for their own interests;" as well in as article 61 of the 1994 CCL:
directors and managers shall not run businesses in the same
category as the company, for themselves or for others, or
pursue activities which will damage their company's
interests. The income derived from the above activities
shall belong to the company. Directors and managers shall
not enter into contracts or dealings either on behalf of
themselves or on behalf of the company except as
(otherwise) provided for in the articles of association.
Both "duty of care" and "duty of loyalty" have much more
concrete and strict enumeration in the China Securities Regulatory
Commission's ("CSRC") "Required Conditions in Articles of
Incorporation of Companies Listed Overseas." ' 3
The 2006 CCL amendment has the same provision as the old
Article 63. However, Article 148 of 2006 CCL imposes, in addition, a
"duty of care" and a "duty of loyalty" on directors, supervisors and
high-level managers." The 2006 CCL amendment does not provide a
definition of the "duty of care," but does retain content similar to that
of Articles 59 and 61 of the 1994 CCL to illustrate the "duty of
loyalty.""0 " A significant difference is that in the new Article 149(5),
directors or high-level managers "are allowed" to run businesses in
the same category as the company, for themselves or others if "they
have the agreement from the shareholders' meeting," whereas the
same situation in the old Article 61 could "never be allowed" to
happen.
According to Article 69 of PRC's Securities Law, issuers,
directors and supervisors and high-level managers of listed companies
are liable for fraudulent records, misleading descriptions or major
omissions in publicly disclosed documents such as financial audit
reports, listed reports, and annual reports. Articles 73 and 74 of the
Securities Law also prohibit insider trading between directors and
supervisors and outsiders.
103. See DAOJING WAISHANGSHI GONGS1 ZHANGCHENG BI BEI TIAOKUAN
[REQUIRED CONDITIONS IN ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF COMPANIES LISTED
OVERSEAS] arts. 115, 116-121 (promulgated by CSRC) (Chi-Wei Huang trans.)
(translation on file with author).
104. Guangyuan Ma, Explanation and Analysis of New Company Law,
Chinalawinfo.com, Dec. 2005.
105. Refer to Articles 52 and 118 of the CCL.
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v. Supervisors
The supervisory board is one of the distinctive characteristics
derived from the German two-tier corporate governance structure.
' 6
According to Article 52 and Article 118 of the 2006 CCL amendment,
a limited liability company and a company limited by shares shall
install a supervisory board composed of no less than three members.
However, a relatively smaller limited liability company may have one
or two supervisors without setting up a supervisory board.
vi. Oualifications
The supervisory board shall be composed of representatives of
shareholders and the proper proportion of the company's
employees.0 7 Company directors and high-level managers may not
also serve as supervisors.9' In addition, supervisors shall avoid the
negative implications indicated in Article 147.
vii. Powers
According to Article 54 of CCL, a supervisory board shall
exercise the following powers: (1) inspect the financial status of the
company; (2) supervise directors' or high-level managers' acts and
submit recall proposals if they violate laws, administrative rules,
articles of incorporation or shareholders' meetings' resolutions; (3)
request directors and high-level managers to correct their acts if they
damage the company's interests; (4) propose to convene interim
shareholders' meetings if the board of directors does not convene and
preside over the shareholders' meeting; (5) submit proposals to the
shareholders' meeting; (6) initiate lawsuits against directors and high-
level managers according to Article 152 of the CCL; and (7) such
other responsibilities as listed in the articles of incorporation of
individual companies. The term of office of the supervisors shall be
three years, and a supervisor may serve consecutive terms if he/she is
re-elected upon expiration.
106. See Gregory J. Thwaite & Jurgen Pesch, A Guide for the Perplexed- Some
Aspects of German Merger and Acquisition Law Explained for Foreign Counsel, 20
INT'L Bus. LAW. 566, 571 (1992). See also Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation on
Corporate Boards. Impacts and Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic
Integration in Europe, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 203, 204 (1994).
107. See Article 52 and Article 118 of the CCL.
108. Id
109. See Article 53 and Article 118 of the CCL.
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viii. Duties
Unlike directors and high-level managers, supervisors only owe a
certain level of fiduciary duty to the corporation and are subject to
liabilities for breach."0 Supervisors are liable for the fake records,
misleading description or major omission in public disclosed
documents in PRC's Securities Law. "1' They are also prohibited to
engage in insider-trading as directors. 2
Upon the establishment of independent directors, a struggle
between supervisors and independent directors over their respective
powers and duties emerged and continues to heat up. This will be
further addressed in later chapters covering independent director.
ix. Conclusion
Considering China's civil law background, the prevailing
corporate form is very likely to retain many elements of the
stakeholder-oriented model. Evidence can be found in Article 1 of
the CCL: "This Law is formulated to protect the legal rights and
interests of companies, shareholders and creditors, to safeguard the
social and economic order and to promote the development of the
socialist market economy." This article discloses that the CCL
anticipates promoting the interests of all involved parties, which are
also known as "stakeholders," rather than merely shareholders. "3
Nonetheless, the importation of a Westernizing shareholding
system to China has helped to rectify a number of problems with
Chinese enterprises' corporate governance, in particular, the state of
such enterprises' balance sheets ahead of a public listing. Recently,
numerous transformations and restructures of SOEs took place to
adopt shareholding ownership system in corporate China."4
110. See Article 148 and Article 150 of the CCL.
111. See Article 59 of the PRC Securities Law.
112. See Articles 73-74 of the PRC Securities Law.
113. Neil King Jr. & James Dean, Untranslatable Word in US. Aide's Speech
Leaves Beijing Baffled, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2005, at Al.
114. Dow Jones Newswires, Bank of China is Restructured, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25,
2004, at C4 (addressing that the state-owned Bank of China has become a
shareholding company 100%-owned by state owned Central Huijin Investment Co.
The Bank of China Shareholding Co., which was known as Bank of China among one
of the four state-owned banks in China, was launched with a registered capital of
186.39 billion yuan (approximately $22.52 billion) and an equal number of shares on
August 23, 2004. This bank was aiming for a domestic listing in 2005. Another
formation of shareholding company ahead of Bank of China is China Construction
Bank. Policy makers proposed to extend the pilot program to Industrial &
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Although several basic statutes in the CCL make it look stakeholder-
oriented, the introduction of other protection mechanisms for
shareholders confirms the determination to establish a healthy
shareholding system with a fairer allocation system in both SOEs and
in privately owned enterprises ("POEs"). The worldwide corporate
governance convergence has silently but effectively influenced the
Chinese corporate governance system. More evidences can be found
in several other rules intended to further strengthen minority
shareholders' interests. What are the most important rules or
mechanism? Are there path dependencies existing along the
transforming process? What are the suggestive solutions? The author
will further explain in Chapter 2.
III. Worldwide Corporate Convergence in China -
Independent Directors in Contemporary China
A. Protective Measures of Minority Shareholders in China
A study conducted by the Shanghai Securities Exchange
identifies the following problems for Chinese corporate governance:
(1) irrational shareholding structure; (2) lack of independence of the
board of directors; (3) inability of the board of supervisors to play its
role; (4) relative weakness of the oversight role of creditors; (5)
unlimited powers of key management personnel; (6) low level of
transparency and professionalism in investment decisions; (7) lack of
a market for corporate control; (8) lack of a market for management
services; (9) skewed system of incentives; (10) lack of protection of
interests of small shareholders; (11) lack of a system for
accountability; and (12) lack of a shareholder and corporate
governance culture."5 The above items (1), (2), (3), (5), (6), and (10)
Commercial Bank of China and Agricultural Bank of China which are both heavily
bad-debt-burdened; see also Sale of 25% Stake is Planned to Foreign Investors
Before IPO, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2005, at A17 (introducing that the municipal
government-owned Bank of Beijing also announced an expectant deal of twenty five
stake transfer between them and a ING Group NV).
115. Gongsi Zhii Zhiyin Chutai [First Guide to Corporate Governance Appears],
ZHONGGUO JINGJI SHIBAO [CHINA ECONOMIC TIMES], Nov. 6, 2000; Pamela Mar &
Michael N. Young, Corporate Governance in Transition Economies: A Case Study of
Two Chinese Airlines, 36 J. OF WORLD BUS. 297 (2001)(reporting that two
publicly listed companies, China Southern Airlines an China Eastern airlines, both of
whose shares are dominated by state. The state has the power to force these Airlines
companies to buy unnecessary air crafts from the state). Qiangui Jiang, Gongsi Zhili
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are all closely related to exploitation of minority shareholders' rights.
The significance of protecting minority shareholders' rights, as the
Shanghai Securities Exchange concluded, resulted mainly from a
unique corporate shareholding structure with strong Chinese
characteristics.
The typical feature of Chinese listed companies has been having
a few dominant controlling shareholders who often hold unlisted state
or legal-person shares as well as a group of scattered minority
shareholders who possess a small portion of listed shares.
Apparently, this concentrated ownership regime hardly experiences
the "agency problem" that is comprehensively discussed by major
American corporate governance literature.116 Nevertheless, Chinese
listed companies are experiencing a severe problem of exploitation of
minority shareholder rights. Under concentrated ownership
structures, the board of directors that is dictated by certain dominant
controlling shareholders will easily appropriate its powers to extract
minority shareholders' interests through means such as insider
dealings, price manipulations, and so on. In China, the problems are
even worse, since the controlling shareholders normally are the
"state," which holds the sovereign power of all administrative
agencies in this Communist country. The state (as the controlling
shareholder) might look to reach its own goals, such as fulfilling the
countrywide full-employment policy or benefiting the state's financial
situation, rather than maximizing profits, which is the goal of regular
shareholders. "7 Such exploitation of minority shareholders' interests
will certainly discourage foreign investment in the Chinese securities
markets. This phenomenon explains why firms without dominant
state ownership have appeared to outperform firms with dominant
state ownership in China.
In order to improve the current performance of the Chinese
securities markets, the Chinese government adopted a series of legal
yu Guoyou Qiye Gaige, Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao [CHINA SEC. NEWS], Internet
ed., June 12, 2001.
116. ADOLPH A. BERLE AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1st ed. 1932).
117. Mar & Young (2001:297), who report that two publicly listed companies,
China Southern Airlines an China Eastern airlines, both of whose shares are
dominated by state. The state has the power to force these Airlines companies to buy
unnecessary air crafts from the state. Jiang (2001) proposes that controlling state
shareholder s voluntarily refrain from policies that might hurt minority shareholders'
right.
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measures to protect minority shareholders against the controlling
shareholders (which primarily refer to the state in China), to help
disperse ownership so as to attract foreign investment. On December
9, 2004, the Chinese government announced sweeping reforming
regulations on protecting minority shareholders' rights,' 8 giving
minority shareholders strong power to have their voices heard." 9 The
China Securities Regulatory Commission (hereinafter "CSRC")
further explained that significant corporate decisions on whether to
proceed with major investment or fund-raising efforts will be decided
by majority voting of public shareholders who attend the
shareholders' annual meeting. The rules are expected to water down
the dominant voting power held by the state, representing nearly $500
billion of listed company equity in China.Y
The 2006 CCL amendment established the flagship protective
measures for minority shareholders' rights. 121 One can examine the
protective measures in the following aspects:
i. Shareholders'Rights to Review
The 2006 amendment expands the shareholders' rights to include
reviewing the minutes of shareholders' meetings, resolutions of the
board of directors and supervisory boards, and the company's
accounting books. 22
i. Shareholders'Rights to Request Acquisition of Shares and
Initiate Lawsuit
According to Article 75, shareholders are allowed to request the
company to acquire their shares: if the company has not distributed
profits for five consecutive profitable years; if the company merges,
separates or transfers primary properties; or if the company could be
118. See "Guanyu Jiaqiang Shehui Gongzhonggu Gudong Quanyi Baohui de
Ruogan Guiding" [Several Rules Regarding Strengthening Protection of Society
Public Shareholders].
119. Dow Jones Newswires, China Gives Minority Shareholders Bigger Role,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2004, at A14.
120. Id.
121. Peter A. Neumann, Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., The PRC Company Law
(2005), at <http://www.faegre.com/articles/article_1743.aspx> (visited Sept. 10, 2007);
Elaine Lo, Johnson Stokes & Master, L.L.P., New PRC Company Law to Come into
Effect on 1 January 2006 (Nov. 24, 2005), at <http://www.rics.org/
Management/Disputeavoidancemanagementandresolution/Disputemanagementandr
esolution/elo001.html> (visited Sept. 10, 2007).
122. Refer to Article 34 of the CCL.
[Vol. 31:1
Worldwide Corporate Convergence
dissolved according to the articles of association. If the shareholders
and the company cannot reach an agreement, the shareholders are
allowed to bring a lawsuit.
iii Shareholders'Rights to Request Dissolution
According to Article 183, shareholders with more than 10% of
the shares are allowed to apply to the People's Court for dissolution
of the company if the shareholders' interests are suffering great
losses.
iv. Cumulative Voting Mechanism
According to Article 106, directors and supervisors could be
elected by cumulative voting if so permitted by the company's articles
of association or shareholders' resolutions.
v. Shareholders'Derivative Suits and Direct Suits
In addition to the managerial powers, the 2006 CCL amendment
grants shareholders the right to bring lawsuits under different
circumstances. Shareholders can initiate lawsuits when the
resolution, or the procedures of a general shareholder or board
meeting, violate the law, administrative rules or the articles of
incorporation.1 23 The 2006 CCL amendment enlarges the range of
shareholder rights to sue. Shareholders are allowed to bring lawsuits
when (1) shareholders and the company cannot reach an agreement
to buy back those shares held by the shareholders under certain
circumstances;"' and (2) directors or high-level managers violate the
laws, administrative regulations or articles of incorporation which
infringe shareholders' rights. 25
The shareholders also are allowed to bring shareholders'
derivative suits, analogous to the shareholders' derivative rights
under the U.S. corporate governance system. According to Article
152 of the 2006 CCL amendment, in cases where there are "directors,
supervisors, high-level managers or other people that infringe on the
company's benefits and other directors or supervisors that remain
quiet during such infringement, the shareholders are eligible to
123. Refer to Article 22 of the 2006 CCL amendments. Similar content can be
found in Article 111 of the 1994 CCL.
124. Refer to Article 75 of the 2006 CCL amendments.
125. See Article 153 of the 2006 CCL Amendments; see Article 210 of PRC
Securities Law.
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initiate a lawsuit in his or her own name for the benefit of the
company."
vi. Independent Directors Requirement
Article 123 of the 2006 CCL amendment requires listed
companies to install an independent director system, but no
stipulation regarding independent directors is addressed in the PRC's
("People's Republic of China") Securities Law.
The 2006 CCL amendment has made significant improvements
on the protection of minority shareholders' rights. Among all the
protective measures, the independent director system is the only
mechanism needing supportive enforcement rules other than CCL to
complete its functional role, and it is the most important and arguable
design for a securities market developing toward a shareholder-
oriented/dispersed-ownership model. The evolution of a Chinese
independent director system represents the epitome in the
development of the Chinese corporate governance structure. The
sections that follow sections will extend discussions and arguments on
the development of the independent director system in China.
IV. Independent Director System in China
China - a civil law country which supposes to focus on the
benefits of stakeholders rather than shareholders in the corporate
governance structure, and a planned market economy which may
focus more on the benefits of general public rather than minority
shareholders' rights - does not seem to be rich soil for the
independent director system. More path dependency problems might
come up during the process of transplanting this independent director
mechanism. How can China fully play out this independent director
system designed for a common law country? Nevertheless, a
capitalist system will be an exciting challenge for Chinese regulators
and for all market participants in China.
Since the independent director system has been widely
introduced and practiced in all aspects of U.S. corporate governance,
it proves insightful to review U.S. experience before observing the
Chinese practice.
[Vol. 31:1
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A. U.S. Experience
i. Role of US. Independent Directors
a. Protector of Shareholder Interests
The concept of independent directors in the United States can be
tracked back to the early 1970s - to the bankruptcy incident of Penn
Central Railroad Company. There were two emerging perspectives
for independent directors during the evolution of the Anglo-
American corporate legal system: protector of shareholder interests
against management; and protector of broader social interests against
the corporations as a whole. The former eventually prevailed over
the latter in U.S. corporate law practice. Unlike consumers, since
employees, creditors or suppliers of the company are capable of
protecting themselves through contracting, shareholders are the only
constituency whose investment is deeply sunk into the company and
can hardly withdraw when something unfortunate happens.'
b. Substitute for External Regulation
As watchdogs, independent directors could be viewed either as a
substitute for external regulation or as its implenter. In America, the
independent director primarily plays the role of a substitute rather
than an implementer of external regulation for corporations."'
Courts and legislatures normally do not involve themselves too
deeply in the business decisions of corporate management. They
leave considerable leeway for the board of directors with independent
directors. In Delaware, even "fair scrutiny" (a fundamental,
unobjectionable idea that promotes that business transactions
between a corporation and a director should be on terms that are fair
to the corporation) is not imposed on corporations as a substantive
rule of law (or the Revised Model Business Corporation Act) if the
transaction has obtained approval from the majority of independent
directors after full disclosure.
126. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 14, at 442; HENRY HANSMANN,
THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 56 (2000).
127. Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate
Governance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125, 152 (2006).
128. Id.
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ii. Corresponding Laws and Rules
Most of the independent directors are allocated to be the
exclusive members of the audit committee, nominating committee
and compensation committee in large publicly held corporations in
American corporate governance. '29 The nominating committee and
compensation committee are not presently required by law.
However, the American Law Institute's (hereinafter "ALI")
Principles of Corporate Governance, 30  the New York Stock
Exchange' (hereinafter "NYSE"), the NASDAQ Stock Market,3 2
the Business Roundtable Statement,'33 the Business Roundtable's
Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness,'' the
Corporate Director's Guidebook,'35 and the Report on Overview
Committees 36 do require or recommend every corporation to have a
nominating committee and a compensation committee which
constitute the majority or exclusively of independent directors. 7
Among the three types of special committees, audit committees
have gradually played a more and more important role over these
past couple of decades. 38 The audit committee is not required as a
matter of state law, except in Connecticut.' 39 However, the Sarbanes-
129. Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations arts.
3.05, 3A.04, 3A.05 (1994).
130. Id
131. New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, Article 303.A.04,
available at <http://www.nyse.com/regulation/listed/1182508124422.html>.
132. NASDAQ, Inc., By-Laws of the NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., § 4.13(f) and
(h), available at <http://www.nasdaq.com/investorrelations/Bylaws.pdf>.
133. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE STATEMENT, at 2108-10, cited in PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS arts. 3A.04, 3A.05
cmts. at 121, 128 (1994).
134. BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AMERICAN
COMPETITIVENESS, at 249, cited in PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS arts. 3A.04, 3A.05 cmts. at 122, 128 (1994).
135. Corporate Director's Guidebook, at 1625-27, cited in Principles of Corporate
Governance: Analysis and Recommendations arts. 3A.04, 3A.05 cmts. at 121, 127
(1994).
136. Report on Overview Committees, at 7-8, cited in Principles of Corporate
Governance: Analysis and Recommendations art. 3A.04 cmt. at 122 (1994).
137. Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations arts.
3A.04, 3A.05 cmts. at 121, 127 (1994).
138. SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (suggesting
that existence of an audit committee creates a sense of "great care and precision
through detailed review and oversight").
139. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-318 (b) (2007).
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Oxley Corporate Reform Act', the ALI's Principles of Corporate
Governance, the Securities Exchanges Commission'41 (hereinafter
"SEC"), the NYSE, 42 the NASDAQ Stock Market,43 the Business
Roundtable Statement,'" the Business Roundtable's Corporate
Governance and American Competitiveness,'45  the Corporate
Director's Guidebook,'46 the Report on Overview Committees,'47 the
Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting (also known as the Treadway Commission)'" do have
definite requirements or recommendations for largely held
corporations to implement and support the oversight function of the
board.1 49  Since the NYSE and the NASDAQ are self-regulatory
bodies, they even have the right to prohibit companies from listing on
their exchanges if the companies do not comply with the
requirements.
Following is a general introduction of major U.S. corporate rules
regarding the independent director system based on requirements of
disinterestedness (independence or significant relationship), presence
of an audit committee as well as personal qualifications:
a. Delaware General Corporation La wand Model Business
Corporation Act
1. Disinterestedness Requirements
A transaction-by-transaction approach on "conflicts of interest"
was taken by the Delaware General Corporation Law (hereinafter
"DGCL") and the Model Business Corporation Act (hereinafter
"MBCA"). The state corporate statutes focus on defining certain
140. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, (2002).
141. Sec. 202 of H.R. 3763-29.
142. Supra note 129, Article 303A.06 and 303.A.07.
143. Supra note 130, at Rule 4350(d).
144. Supra note 131, at 218-19.
145. Business Roundtable, Principles Corporate Statement, 16 (2002), available at
<http://www.businessroundtable.org/pdf/704.pdf>.
146. Supra note 133, at 1627.
147. Supra note 134, at 1351-60.
148. James C. Treadway, Jr. et. Al., Report of the National Commission of
Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 40-1 (National Commission on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting 1987), available at, http://www.nccg.ru/en/site.xp/057053056124.html.
149. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS art. 3.05 cmt. at 104 (1994).
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business transactions involving "conflicts of interest," - such as
transactions between a corporation and its directors or officers, or
between a corporation and another business entity, in which one of its
directors or officers has related interests or the business opportunities
taken by the corporate officers might belong to the corporation - and
provide certain scrutiny of whether those who made the decisions had
conflicts of interest.'0 One recent shareholders' derivative action was
initiated by the shareholders of Oracle Corporation, alleging insider
trading by the corporation's chief executive officer (hereinafter
"CEO"), chief financial officer (hereinafter "CFO"), and two
directors.' The Court of Chancery of Delaware held that ties52 with
the Special Litigation Committee (hereinafter "SLC") were so
substantial as to cause reasonable doubt about the members'
independence. The Court further explained that "assessing the
independence of the corporation's SLC required an examination of
whether the SLC could independently make the difficult decision
entrusted to it: whether the CEO, CFO and two directors should face
suit for insider trading-based allegations of breach of fiduciary duty."
The state statutes were actually designed to displace the common
law rules on conflict-of-interest transactions. The common law ruling
on conflicts of interest in many states in the late 19th century was
absolute: Many dealings involving conflicts of interest could easily be
rejected by the insistence of any stockholder.'53 The common law
rules made the transactions involving conflicts of interests
defenseless. The person involved in conflict-of-interest dealings was
supposed to be liable for returning the corporation to the status quo
ante according to common law rules. The state statutes allow the
existence of conflict-of-interest dealings if they fulfill certain
conditions, such as the disclosure of the conflict-of-interest dealings
or approval of these dealings by disinterested decision makers,
whether directors or shareholders. Not having met the conditions
does not necessarily indicate that the dealing is unlawful. It merely
means that the common law rules might be applied by a court if any
150. Clarke, supra note 125, at 182.
151. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d. 917, 920-21 (Del. Ch. 2003).
152. Id. at 947. Ties among the Special Litigation Committee and directors to the
university were, for example, being tenured professors and major benefactors.
153. See, e.g., Wardell v. R.R. Co., 103 U.S. 651, 658 (1881) ("The law, therefore,
will always condemn the transactions of a party on his own behalf when, in respect to
the matter concerned, he is the agent of others, and will relieve against them
whenever their enforcement is seasonably resisted.").
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shareholder brings a suit. Examples could be found in both the
DGCL and the MBCA.
Article 144 of the DGCL claims that a transaction is not void
solely by a conflict of interest involved in a director's or an officer's
standing on both sides if one of the following conditions is fulfilled:
(1) the relevant facts of the dealing have been disclosed to the board
and a majority of disinterested directors ratify in good faith; (2) the
relevant facts of the dealing have been disclosed to the shareholders
entitled to vote, and the shareholders ratify this dealing in good
faith;"' or (3) the terms set forth in the transactions, as of the time the
directors or the shareholders authorize it, appear to be fair to the
corporation. It is important to note that the last provision of Article
144 provides that the vote of interested directors may be counted for
the purpose of a quorum or a committee authorizing the transaction.
The MBCA is intended to deal with director conflicts of interest,
leaving all other issues to the states' existing common law
jurisprudence. The MBCA suggests that shareholders cannot
demand damages, injunction, or any other remedy on the grounds of
the existence of conflicts of interest that meet one of the following
requirements: (1) sufficient disclosure was given, and approval from a
majority of disinterested directors followed; (2) sufficient disclosure
was given, and approval from a majority of disinterested shareholders
followed; or (3) the terms set forth in the transaction at the time it
occurs appear to be fair to the corporation.
The significant difference would be the distinct requirement of
"disinterested directors" and "disinterested shareholders" as the only
groups who are empowered to ratify the issues of self-dealing in
MBCA, whereas the Delaware state government is more open
regarding this requirement. Neither of them provides an absolute
and general definition of "independence," however, or require rigid
institution of an "independent director system." They instead make a
transaction-by-transaction scrutiny on "full disclosure" or
"disinterest" in particular conflict-of-interest dealings.
154. The Delaware statute does not explicitly require ratification by disinterested
shareholders; however, this requirement has been spelled out by case law. See, e.g.,
Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A. 2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987) ("[A]pproval by fully-
informed disinterested directors under section 144(a)(1), or disinterested
stockholders under section 144(a)2, permits invocation of the business judgment rule
and limits judicial review to issues of gift or waste with the burden of proof upon the
party attacking the transaction.").
20081
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
b. American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate
Governance
1. Significant Relationship Requirements
In Article 1.34 of the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance,
a clear explanation of "significant relationship" is given as follows: (1)
the director is under the corporation's employment within the two
preceding years; (2) the director is an immediate family member '55 of
an officer or a senior executive within the two preceding years; (3) the
director has involved certain monetary activities156 which exceeded
$200,000 during the two preceding years; and (4) the director is
affiliated in a professional capacity with a law firm or an investment
banking firm to the corporation or has acted as a managing
underwriter in an issue of the corporation's securities within the two
preceding years. " '
The ALI Principles specifically note that the definition of
"significant relationship" in Article 1.34 is not synonymous with the
definition of "interested" in Article 1.23.
2. Independent Directors on the Board
The ALI suggests every large publicly held corporation'58 should
have a majority of directors who are free of any "significant
relationship" with the senior executives on the board. The ALI also
suggests that every publicly held corporation should have at least
three directors who are free of any "significant relationship" with
their senior executives on the board.
Article 1.23 also suggests that "[t]he audit committee should
consist of at least three members, and should be composed
exclusively of directors who are neither employed by the corporation
nor were so employed within the two preceding years, including at
least a majority of members who have no "significant relationship"' '5 9
155. ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 1.34 (1994).
156. ALl, supra note 153, § 1.34(a)(3)-(4).
157. ALl, supra note 153, § 1.34(a)(5).
158. "'Large publicly held corporation' means a corporation that as of the record
date for its most recent annual shareholders' meeting had both 2,000 or more record
holders . . . of its equity securities ... and $100 million or more of total assets .... "
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS art.
1.24 at 29 (1994).
159, See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
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with the corporation's senior executives.''6°
3. Powers and Responsibilities of the Audit Committee
According to Article 3.05 of the ALI's Principles of Corporate
Governance, "[e]very large publicly held corporation should have an
audit committee to implement and support the oversight function of
the board. The functions and powers of audit committees should
include: (1) recommending the outside auditing firm, reviewing its
compensation and its proposed engagement terms as well as its
independence; (2) reviewing the assignment of the senior internal
auditing executive, if any; (3) communicating between the external
auditing firm, the board, and the senior internal auditing executive;
(4) reviewing the corporation's annual financial statements and
documents prepared by the outside auditing firm in connection with
the audit as well as reports of the internal auditing department; (5)
considering the adequacy of the corporation's internal controls in
consultation with the outside auditing firm and the senior internal
auditing executive; and (6) considering major changes and questions
regarding appropriate accounting principles and practices to be used
in the corporation's financial statements.
c. Rules of the New York Stock Exchange
The NYSE, established in 1792, is one of the world's leading and
most technologically advanced equities markets and is under the
oversight of the SEC. A broad spectrum of market participants,
including listed companies, individual institutional investors and
RECOMMENDATIONS art. 1.34 at 34-35 (1994) (giving more information of the
definition of "significant relationship").
160. The roles of independent directors in major corporate governance principles,
rules and legislation are introduced closely with the composition of audit committees.
In addition to NYSE, both the American Stock Exchange (American Stock
Exchange, LLC, Part 1 Original Listing Requirements, Section 121(B)) and
NASDAQ (Supra note 130, at Schedule D) recommend or require their listed
companies to equip with audit committees. The Business Roundtable Statement does
give emphasis on the significance of three critical board committees which include
the audit committee, and the audit committee was required to be composed entirely
of non-management directors. Supra note 131, at 218-19. To the same effect are the
Business Roundtable's Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness
(supra note 132, at 1627), the Corporate Director's Guidebook (supra note 133, at
1627), the Report on Overview Committees (supra note 134, at 1351-60), as well as
the Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
(Treadway Commission) (supra note 146, at 40-41).
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member firms participate in the business activities in this fair,
open and orderly market to access the best possible price through the
interplay of supply and demand. As of December 31, 2006, the
NYSE and NYSE Arca were home to approximately 2,764 world-
class issuers.16
1. Independence Requirements
Members of the audit committee cannot serve on the audit
committee under the following circumstances: (1) employment: a
member director is/was an employee of the company or any of its
affiliates or its parent or predecessor within the three preceding years;
(2) business relationship: a member director is a partner, controlling
shareholder, or executive officer of an entity which engages in
business activities with the company, or serves as a consultant for the
company, unless the company's board of directors made a business
judgment that this business relationship will not impair this member
director's independence; (3) cross compensation committee: a
member director serves as an executive of another entity where any
of this company's executives serve on such other entity's
compensation committee; (4) immediate family: a member director's
immediate family member is an executive officer of the company or
its affiliates within the three preceding years.162
2. Independent Directors on Audit Committees
The NYSE requires that each of its listed companies set up and
maintain an audit committee which "shall consist of at least three
directors, all of who have no relationship to the company that may
interfere with the exercise of their independence from management
and the company."' 63
3. Conflict of Interest
According to Article IV, Section 15 of the constitution of NYSE,
no director shall participate in the deliberation or adjudication of any
161. <http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/1170350259411.html>.
162. New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, Art. 303A.02(b)(iii)(a-
d), available at <http://www.nyse.com/regulation/listed/1182508124422.html> (follow
"click here to open the NYSE Listed Company Manual" hyperlink).
163. New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual, Article 303A.07(a),
303A.07(b) (referencing 303A.02); available at <http://www.nyse.com/
regulation/listed/1182508124422.html>.
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matter in which he or she is personally interested.
4. Professional Qualifications
At least one of the audit committee members should be an
expert in accounting or financial management.164
d. Rules of the NASDA 0
The NASDAQ is the largest electronic stock market in the
United States. With approximately 3,300 companies, it lists more
companies and, on average, trades more shares per day than any
other U.S. securities markets. Its listed companies are leaders across
all areas of business, including technology, retail, communications,
financial services, transportation, media and biotechnology. As with
the NYSE, it also is under the supervision of the SEC.
1. Independence Requirements
According to Article 4200(a)(15) of the NASDAQ Marketplace
Rules (the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,) the independent
director is defined as "a person other than an officer or employee of
the company or its subsidiaries or any other individual having a
relationship which, in the opinion of the company's board of
directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment
in carrying out the responsibilities of directors.,
165
164. Id. at Article 303A.07(a) commentary.
165. Following[0] is a detailed description of a person who shall not be considered
an independent director: (1) a person employed by the company or by any parent or
subsidiary of the company at any time during the past three years; (2) a person or his
or her family member who accepted any payments from the company or its parent or
subsidiary in excess of U.S. $60,000 during any period of twelve consecutive months
within the three years preceding the judgment regarding independence, other than
for the following reasons: (a) compensation for board of directors or board
committee service; (b) payments from investments in the company's securities; (c)
compensation paid to a family member who is a nonexecutive employee of the
company or its parent or subsidiary; (d) profits under a tax-qualified retirement plan,
or nondiscretionary compensation; (e) loans or payments from a financial institution,
only on the condition that these loans or payments: (i) were made in the ordinary
course of business; (ii) were made on substantially the same terms as those prevailing
at the time for comparable transactions with the general public; (iii) did not involve
more than a normal degree of risk or other unfavorable factors; (iv) were not
otherwise subject to the specific disclosure requirements of SEC Regulation S-K,
Item 404; (v) were not otherwise subject to the disclosure requirements of SEC
Regulation S-K, Item 404; or (vi) were permitted under Section 13(k) of the Act[0].
NASDAQ, Inc., Marketplace Rules § 4200(a)(14) (2007), available at<http://nasdaq.
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2. Independent Directors on Audit Committees
According to Article 4200(1)(14) of the NASDAQ Marketplace
Rules, national markets must institute an audit committee with no
less than three directors, and all of the directors should be
independent. For certain small companies, they may have an audit
committee composed of a majority of members who are independent
directors.
3. Independence Requirements for Audit Committees
In addition to the requirements of Article 4200(1)(14),
independent directors serving on the audit committee are subject to
additional, more stringent requirements under Rule 4350(d) and
cannot serve if: (1) a director's family member is or was an executive
officer of the company or its parent or subsidiary individual at any
time during the past three years; (2) a director's family member is a
partner, controlling shareholder, or executive officer of any entity to
which the company made or from which the company received
payments for property or services in the current or any of the past
three fiscal years that exceed 5% the recipient's consolidated gross
revenues for that year or $200,000, whichever is more, other than the
following: (a) payments from investments in the company's securities;
or (b) payments under charitable contribution matching programs;
(3) a director of the listed company who is, or whose family member
is, employed as an executive officer of another organization where at
any time during the past three years, any of the executive officers of
the listed company served on the compensation committee of such
other entity; or (4) a director who is, or whose family member is, a
current partner of the company's outside auditor, or was a partner or
employee of the company's outside auditing firm who worked on the
company's audit at any time during any of the past three years.
An the case of an investment company, an "interested" director
of an investment company is defined in Section 2(a)(19) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, rather than in his or her capacity
as a member of the board of directors or any board committee.
complinet.com/nasdaq/display/display.html?rbid=1705&elementid=18> ("'Family
Member' means a person's spouse, parents, children and siblings, whether by blood,
marriage or adoption, or anyone residing in such person's home.").
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e. Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate Reform Act (2002)
The role of the independent director mechanism has a complete
and aggressive description in the Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate Reform
Act (hereinafter "SOX"), which was signed into law on July 30, 2002,
along with rules proposed by two stock exchanges '66 in the United
States. The significance of the SOX, however, lies not in its invention
of the concept of an independent director, but in its creation of a
variety of mandatory corporate functions, the vast increase of their
legal complexity, and the enhancement of the requirement of
corporate judgment.1 67 The SOX, known as the corporate-oversight
law, requires greater independence by corporate directors in order to
solve the scandals at Enron, Tyco, WorldCom and elsewhere. The
independent director mechanism was promoted by Sarbanes and by
Arthur Levitt in 2002. This Act tried to prompt greater vigilance by
the audit committees.
1. Independent Directors on Audit Committees
The SOX requires that an audit committee to review a
company's accounting practices, and that the committee be made up
solely of independent directors.168
2. Independence (Disinterestedness) Requirements of Audit
Committees
In order to be considered as independent directors to serve on an
audit committee, a member of the audit committee may not receive
"any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee" from the
company, affiliate to the company, or any of its subsidiaries.1
61
3. Powers and Responsibilities of Audit Committees
The audit committee was established to audit the financial and
accounting processes.Y This audit committee "shall be directly
responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the
166. New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ.
167. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward B. Rock, A New Player in the Boardroom:
The Emergence of the Independent Directors' Counsel, 59 Bus. Law. 1389, 1393
(2004).
168. Section 301(m)(3)(A) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (amending 15
U.S.C. 78f).
169. Id. at § 301(m)(3)(B).
170. Id at § 205 (amending Section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
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work of any registered public accounting firm employed by the issuer
(including resolution of disagreements between management and the
auditor regarding financial reporting) for the purpose of preparing or
issuing an audit report or related work and each such registered
public accounting firm shall report directly to the audit committee.,171
The audit committee will need to "establish procedures for (A)
the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints received by the
issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing
matters; and (B) the confidential, anonymous submission by
employees of the issuer of concerns regarding questionable
accounting or auditing matters.
172
The audit committee ought to supervise and ensure that the audit
team not stay in its position longer than permitted.7 ' The audit
committee has the authority to hire independent counsel and other
174
advisers at company expense.
All those new responsibilities set forth in the SOX may require
the audit committees to stay in contact with outside auditors on a
regular, continuous basis, and committee members may expect to
meet in continuous sessions sometimes.
175
4. Professional Qualification
In addition, the company must disclose whether at least one of
those committee members is a "financial expert," and if not, explain
the reason.1
76
f Implementation of the Independent Director System in the
United States
The independent director system first obtained its clear
definition in corporate America after it was signed into law as the
SOX. The SOX has been considered the most comprehensive and
powerful corporate reform act to date. Many criticisms thereafter,
171. Id. at § 301 (amending Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
172. Id. at § 301(m)(3)(4).
173. Id. at § 203 (amending Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
174. See Hazard & Rock, supra, note 165, at 1394.
175. Peter M. Collins, Outside Counsel: Sarbanes-Oxley Act Creates a New Role
for the Audit Committee, 228 N.Y. L.J., Oct. 17, 2002, at 12.
176. Sarbanes-Oxiey Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 407 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (Supp. II 2002)).
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however, have targeted the intention and efficiency of the SOX. 1 7 7
The SOX was criticized as a U.S. Patriot Act which was driven by the
political needs of the U.S. Congress to appear to be diligent in their
incumbencies in response to the terrorist attacks of 2001.178 The SOX
was designed to regulate in areas that have traditionally been left to
state corporate law.179 The enactment of this Act may signal the birth
of "the creeping federalization of corporate law,"" since it dictates a
one-size-fits-all process for testing internal controls for most public
listed companies."" This Act does not just passively "prohibit"
conduct, but aggressively "mandates" the structure and operation of
audit committees. The SEC has come under fire from the business
community for its regulatory approach, causing it to host a roundtable
discussion to "evaluate the implementation" of the SOX. The SEC's
recent response signals that it would consider adjusting the relevant
provisions of the SOX, if necessary.
8 2
One SOX reform is the requirement that independent directors
sit on audit committees. These independent directors are completely
independent, receiving no salary or fees from the company other than
for service as directors. The SOX then says CEOs, who under
another part of the law may be liable for criminal penalties for
earnings misstatements, have no say in hiring the outside auditor.
The audit committee is the agency responsible for hiring, overseeing
and compensating the auditors, and the auditor must report directly
to the committee, not company management. Serving on a board has
lost much of its appeal as a wave of corporate scandals has made this
old-time prestigious position increasingly risky, particularly
considering ten former WorldCom and Enron directors agreed in
recent tentative court settlements to shell out a total of $18 million
and $13 million, respectively, from their own pockets to settle
shareholder lawsuits.83
177. John Berlau, Sarbanes-Oxicy is Business Disaster, INSIGHT MAGAZINE, Jan.
22, 2004, at 1-2.
178. Id. at 1.
179. Notes from Professor David Skeel of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School, March 18, 2005.
180. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, Regulation,
Spring 2003, at 26, 26.
181. Id at 29.
182. Deborah Solomon, SEC to Host Talks on Contentious Rules, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 8, 2005, at A3.
183. Antia Raghavan, More CEOs Say "No Thanks" to Board Seats, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 28, 2005, at B1.
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Although the NYSE and NASDAQ have both proposed the
facility of independent directors with relevant rules and regulations,
there is no concrete evidence to show that companies with strong
independent director boards will advocate more strongly for
shareholder interests. A large-sample study even found that "firms
with more independent boards are not more profitable; indeed, there
were hints in the data that they perform worse than other firms""'
Enron, an ironic illustration of this point, whose board was comprised
of eighty-six percent independent directors, which would have
complied nearly perfectly with the SOX. It is doubtful that the
stricter the legal rules are, the more likely people will be well
behaved.185  Even though those strict rules are presumed to be
effective and helpful in supervising corporate governance, companies
have their own discretion to choose not to be burdened by them. The
number of companies that delisted their common shares from stock
exchanges in order to avoid increased outside scrutiny tripled in
2003.'86
The "independence" issue is a debatable topic in the U.S.
boardroom lately. The NYSE and NASDAQ have been imposing
rules since 2004 to boost the requisite number of disinterested
directors .187 The NYSE rules require a majority of all directors to be
"independent," as shall all directors on audit, nominating,
compensation and corporate-governance committees. The definition
of independent directors here refer to directors who are executives at
entities that have significant business with the listed company they
serve totaling more than $1 million, or two percent of the entity's
184. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 263 (2001-
2002) ("[T]here is no evidence that greater board independence leads to improved
firm performance. If anything, there are hints that greater board independence may
impair firm performance. [R]esearch [does] not support the conventional wisdom
favoring the monitoring board, with a high degree of board independence.").
185. "Strapped for time, the board must trust and rely on management. The board
can ask the auditors to check things, but even the auditors can't spend enough time
to prevent problems. What prevents problems very simply is management choosing
to run a clean ship, period," said T. J. Rodgers, the outspoken libertarian CEO of
Cypress Semiconductor Corp. when he was interviewed by Insight Magazine.
186. Peter Loftus, Delisting Soared in 2003, Study Shows, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15,
2004, at B3F (referring to a study co-authored by professors from the Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Maryland's Robert H.
Smith School of Business).
187. John R. Emshwiller & Joann S. Lublin, In Boardrooms, "Independent" is
Debatable, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2005, at C1.
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revenue, whichever is greater. 88 Nonetheless, a review of 150
corporate filings initiated by the Wall Street Journal highlights how
exceptions and qualified independent directors under the rules
limited their corporate governance effectiveness.89 Companies have
made their own calls on defining "independence," regularly checking
with exchanges to discuss specific directors." When it comes to
particular cases, it is a matter of "disinterestedness." The DGCL,
MBCA and SOX provide for judgment on an a case by case basis.
B. Chinese Practice
i. Role of Chinese Independent Directors
a. Protector of Shareholders 'Interests
Deriving from the civil law system, different from the common
law system, China supposes to pay more attention on the interests of
stakeholders than shareholders in the corporate governance structure.
Since China borrows the independent director system from the
Anglo-American corporate law system, however, the notion of the
independent director as representing stakeholders is lost in the newly
established Chinese independent director system. The independent
directors in China are expected to act solely to protect shareholders'
rights 191 instead of serving the broader social interests against the
corporations as a whole.
According to CSRC's requirements, independent directors
generally owe a duty of good faith (chengxin) and diligence (qinmian)
to the company and shareholders. The CSRC requests the
independent directors to act in a manner that he or she reasonably
believes to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation, pay special attention on the interests of small and
medium shareholders, and clearly address that they are not to be
influenced by major shareholders, controlling management, or others
who have a crucial relationship of interest with the said company.192The independent directors are to be the protector of minority
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. La Porta et al., supra note 25.
192. CSRC, Notice on Release of Directive Opinions at §1.2.
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shareholders' interests to voice their needs and concerns, not the
defender of the controlling shareholders' or general social interests.
The Chinese literature and statutes contain generalities about the
functions of independent directors, such as preventing corruption,
daring to ask sharp questions, and questioning the board's decisions
and management operation in order to ensure fair corporate
governance practice. For most of the discussions in China, the
independent director system is regarded as a special prescription of
medicine which is able to cure every disease that a company might
have.
b. Substitute for External Regulation
Similar to American independent directors, Chinese independent
directors also tend to play the role of a substitute for external
regulation in relevant rules and guidelines. They are not only
expected to help implement those standards at issue, but also are
perceived as a substitute for the external regulation. Those regulators
tried to leave independent directors room for their independent, fair
judgment.
ii Corresponding Rules and Guidelines
Both scholars who advocate the absolute effect of rule of law and
neoclassical economists alike have argued about whether rule of law
is an indispensable element of sustainable economic development. 93
For the past couple of decades, China has showed the world
prominent economic growth without either duly perfecting their
market mechanism or their domestic rule of law, leaving many
political scientists, economists and legal experts puzzled." China has
been able to achieve phenomenal growth in the late 1990s thanks to it
distinct economic and political evolutionary history.95 Nowadays, the
Chinese are not satisfied with their established accomplishments but
want to look for more outside investments.
193. PEERENBOOM, supra note 55, at 19 (citing generally KATHARINA PISTOR &
PHILIP A. WELLONS, THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, (1999); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, (1990).
194. Id at 19 (citing Geoffrey MacCormack, The Traditional Chinese Penal Law
(1990).
195. Id. at 19 (asserting that the Chinese economic growth has been attributed to
"cultural factors, a district form of Chinese capitalism, a guanxi (connection) based
rule of relationships, clientelism, and corporatism.)
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According to a 1997 World Bank report, "countries with stable
governments, predictable methods of changing laws, secure property
rights, and a strong judiciary saw higher investment and growth than
countries lacking these institutions."'9 6 In order to attract higher
investment, Chinese regulators are trying to make the investment
environment more transparent and predictable.
Although it seems that China has transplanted the whole
independent director system from Western models, the
developmental process of China's system is different from that of the
West. The Western market-oriented economic model is oriented
toward Darwinian rules: the existing structures and institutions are
presumed to be relatively efficient ones'97 unless path dependency
considerations are involved. The independent director system has
resulted from a series of rule competitions in a market-oriented
economic model. China, however, with a market-planned economic
model, has taken many active steps through various Chinese
governments or other authorities to encourage or require the
installation of the independent director system before the players
involved clearly feel the need. Requirements of independent
directors are "administratively" imposed.9 Rules, guidelines and
regulations which require the establishment of the independent
director system are promoted in quasi-corporate China."9
a. Stock Exchange Rules
There are two stock exchanges in China: Shanghai and
Shenzhen. The Shanghai Stock Exchange was founded on November
26, 1990, and went into operation on December 19 of the same year.2°
The Shenzhen Stock Exchange was established on December 1,
196. Id. at 450 (citing the World Development Report 1997: The State in a
Changing World, The World Bank (1999).
197. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The
Transaction Cost Approach, 87 Am. J. Soc. 548, 573-74 (1981); see also Oliver E.
Williamson & William Ouchi, A Rejoinder, in PERSPECrIVES ON ORGANIZATION
DESIGN AND BEHAVIOR 389 (Andrew H. Van de Ven & William F. Joyce eds., John
Wiley & Sons 1981).
198. Clarke, supra note 125, at 146.
199. By "quasi-corporate China," I mean a special transitional period for China
which seems to drift inexorably toward a market economy model, but cannot avoid
the struggle with the old planned economy model.
200. Shanghai Stock Exchange Brief Introduction, http://www.sse.com.cn/
sseportal/en-us/ps/about/bi.shtml (visited Sep. 14,2007).
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1990. '0 Compared to the Shanghai Stock Exchange, the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange is considered a relatively small securities market
bearing high risks.2O Both of these stock exchanges are non-profit-
making membership institutions, directly governed by the CSRC.
Their obligations are to legislate, supervise, self-regulate and
standardize all of their listed companies under the PRC's Securities
Law. °3 The most effective power reserved to the stock exchanges is
to "delist" their listed companies if the companies break the rules of
the two securities exchanges or the CSRC.2°
1. Shanghai Stock Exchange Rules
The Shanghai Stock Exchange issued Shangshi Gongsi Zhili
Zhiyin Caoan [Listed Company Governance Guidelines Draft]
(hereinafter "Shanghai Guidelines") in November 2000. These
Shanghai Guidelines were believed to provide a more refined version
of the independent director system 5 than the CSRC's Shangshi
Gongsi Zhangcheng Zhiyin [Guidelines for the Articles of
Association of Listed Companies] of 1997.
2. Independent Directors on the Board
The Shanghai Guidelines require listed companies to have at
least two independent directors. The independent directors should
constitute at least twenty percent of the board of directors and at least
thirty percent when the chairman of the board of directors and the
general manager is the same person.
3. Independent Directors on the Audit Committee
The Shanghai Guidelines also stipulate that all subcommittees of
the board of directors have to be composed (principally) of and
201. Shenzhen Stock Exchange Overview, http://www.szse.cn/main/en/
aboutsse/sseoverview/ (last visited Sep. 14, 2007).
202. Jack J.T. Huang, Waizi Bingou Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi de Fazhan [The
Development Concerning How Foreign Investment Merges Chinese Listed
Companies], JINGJI Ri BAO [ECON. DAILY] (Beijing), Nov. 22, 2004, at 7 (Chi-Wei
Huang trans.) (translation on file with author).
203. See Article 178-180 of PRC Securities Law.
204. Clarke, supra note 125, at 211.
205. Huiling Luo, Lun "Duli Dongshi'"Comments on Independent Directorsj,
ZHONGGUO HONGHUAN JINGJI WANG [CHINESE MACRO ECON. NEWS NET], May 18,
2001 (Chi-Wei Huang trans.) (translation on file with author),
<http://www.macrochina.com.cn/zhztOOOO62/003/20010518005939.shtml>.
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(chaired) by independent directors.2°
While many significant expectations were imposed on the role of
"independent directors" in these Shanghai Guidelines, it was
surprising to find that there was no description of the independence
or disinterestedness requirements of independent directors.
4. Shenzhen Stock Exchange Rules
The Stock Regulatory Office of Shenzhen promulgated the
Shangshi Gongsi Duli Dongshi Zhidu Shishi Zhiyin [Guidelines for
the Implementation of an Independent Director System in Listed
Companies] in 2001.Although both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges have their own stipulations about independent directors,
their most recent rules regarding the institution and review of
independent directors require them to follow the standards in the
CSRC's Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the
Board of Directors of Listed Companies (Guanyu Zai Shangshi
Gongsi Jianli Duli Dongshi Zhidu Zhiyin)s.
5. Regional Government Rules
There are several regional governments that require their
domestic SOEs or private companies to institute independent director
systems.
b. Shenzhen Municipal Government
Guanyu Jinyibu Jiakuai Woshi Guoyu Qiye Gaige He Fazhan de
Shishi Yijian [Opinion on Implementing the Further Acceleration of
the Reform and Development of Shenzhen State-Owned Enterprises]
was issued by the Shenzhen municipal government in January 2001.
This Shenzhen opinion requested an appropriate proportion of
independent directors to be added to the boards of state asset
management companies. °7
c. Hebei Provincial Government
The "Provisional Measures for Standardizing the Governance of
Company Legal Persons" (Guifan Gongsi Faren Jiegou Zhanxing
206. Shanghai Stock Exchange, "Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhiyin Caoan" ["Shanghai
Listed Company Governance Guidelines Draft"], art. 16 (Nov. 2000) (Chi-Wei
Huang trans.) (translation on file with author).
207. Clarke, supra note 125, at 179.
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Banfa) was issued by the Hebei Provincial Government in late 2001.
The Hebei Measures require domestic companies to install
independent directors, but leave the proportion of independent
directors to be determined by the individual company's articles of
association.2°8
These measures are claimed to be mandatory and require
companies to have independent directors from such professional
fields as economics, finance, law and securities trading..
d. Guangzhou City
The "State-Owner Capital Authorized Operation Institution
Provisional Rules Governing Independent Directors" ("Guangzhou
Shi Guoyu Zichan Shouquan Jinying Jigou Duli Dongshi Guanli
Zhanxin Banfa") were issued by Guangzhou City on December 30,
2001. These rules do have definite requirements for the professional
background and independence of corporate directors.2° Under theses
rules, independent directors have powers that allow them to involve
themselves deeply with the company's operations. Nevertheless, they
are liable for company losses if those losses are caused by their
misconduct.1 a
C. "Guidelines for the Articles of Association of Listed
Companies" (Shangshi Gongsi Zhangcheng Zhiyin)
The development of securities markets in China led to the
establishment of a centralized market regulatory body in 1978. The
establishment of the State Council Securities Commission
(hereinafter "SCSC") and the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (hereinafter "CSRC") in October 1992 marked the
official formation of this centralized market regulatory body. The
SCSC is a state authority responsible for exercising regulations
governing the centralized market. The CSRC is the executive agency
of SCSC, responsible for conducting supervision and regulation of the
securities markets in accordance with the relevant rules.
In March 1995, the State Council formally approved the CSRC
208. Art 19 of the "Guifan Gongsi Fanren Jiegou Zhanxing Banfa" ["Provisional
Measures for Standardizing the governance of Company Legal Persons" ].
209. Arts. 4 and 5, Guangzhou Shi Guoyu Zichan Shouquan Jinying Jigou Duli
Dongshi Guanli Zhanxin Banfa [ "State Owned Capital Authorized Operation
Institution Provisional Rules Governing Independent Directors"].
210. Id. at Art. 6.
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Organizational Plan thereby confirming CSRC to be a deputy-
ministry rank unit directly under the State Council and the executive
branch of the SCSC. In August 1997, the State Council decided to
establish the securities exchange markets in both Shanghai and
Shenzhen under the supervision of the CSRC. Offices of the CSRC
commissioners were set up in these two municipalities. At the
National Finance Conference held by the Central People's
Government in November 1998, it was decided to reform the national
securities regulatory body to directly supervise the local securities
regulatory departments, and to place the securities organizations
formerly supervised by the People's Bank of China under the
centralized supervision of the CSRC. In April 1998, according to the
State Council Reform Plan, the SCSC and the CSRC were merged to
form one ministry-rank agency directly under the State Council. The
power and the functions of the CSRC have been strengthened since
the reform. A centralized securities supervisory system was thus
established. The CSRC not only has the power to regulate and
supervise, but also has the power to investigate or levy penalties for
illegal activities related to securities and futures."' The CSRC has
issued several regulations regarding corporate governance for listed
companies to follow and the independent director system has
constantly been emphasized in those regulations. The Guidelines for
the Articles of Association of Listed Companies" ("Shangshi Gongsi
Zhangcheng Zhiyin") (hereinafter "Guidelines") issued on December
16, 1997, was the first corporate governance regulation from the
CSRC. In the Guidelines, the CSRC gives listed companies relatively
clear guidance with respect to their articles of association. The listed
companies whose articles of association diverge considerably from the
Guidelines, must obtain approval of the CSRC.
i. Independence Requirements
The independent director requirement was does not figure
prominently in the Guidelines. Article 112 is the only article which
gives mention to independent directors. It states, "the company may
elect independent directors according to its actual needs," and
excludes "(1) shareholders or those employed by shareholding
entities; (2) internal personnel of the company (such as the manager
of an employee); (3) persons with self-interested relationship with
211. See Introduction to the CSRC, [http://211.154.210.238/en/homepage
/index-en.jsp] or <http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/index.html>.
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affiliates or management levels of the company" from independent
director qualification."'
The Guidelines do not use any definite terms to require the
institution of special committees, or to establish the proportion,
qualifications, powers and duties of independent directors.
D. Central Government Rules
i, SETC/CSRC Opinion on Further Promoting the Standard
Operation and Deeper Reform of Companies Listed
Overseas (Guojia fingii Maoyi Weiyuan Hui/Zhongguo
Zhengan Hui Guanyu Jin Yi Bu Cujin Jingwai Shangshi
Gongsi Guifan Yunzou He Shenhua Gaige de Yjian)
The SET/CSRC Opinion were jointly issued by the CSRC and
the State Economic and Trade Commission on March 29, 1999.213
Since 1990, the average amount invested in overseas merger and
acquisition activities reached 200 million dollars and, in 2002, the
amount climbed to 600 million dollars.214 This phenomenon triggered
a need for the government to better regulate companies listed abroad.
The SET/CSRC Opinions were established to require the ownership
of companies listed abroad to be separated from the controlling body
in its very first section.215 It is interesting to find that the SET/CSRC
Opinions refer to "outside director" and "independent director" in
the same section, which requests that overseas listed companies have
at least two independent directors and that outside directors fill at
least half of the board.
212. See Shangshi Gongsi Zhangcheng Zhiyin ["Guidelines on Articles of
Association for Listed Companies"](promulgated by the CSRC, effective Dec. 16,
1997), Art. 112.
213. Donald C. Clark, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate
Governance, 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 125-228 (2006).
214. Jack J.T. Huang, Zhongguo Qiye Haiwai Binggou de Fazhan [Developments
on the M&A Activities of Chinese Enterprises Involved Overseas], JINGJI RIBAO
[ECON. DAILY] (Beijing), Nov. 8, 2004, at 7 (Chi-Wei Huang trans.) (translation on
file with author).
215. According to Section 1 of "Guojia Jingji Maoyi Weiyuan Hui/Zhongguo
Zhengjian Hui Guanyu Jin Yi Bu Cujin Jingwai Shangshi Gongsi Guifan Yunzou He
Shenhua Gaige de Yijian " ["Opinion on Further Promoting the Standard Operation
and Deeper Reform of Companies Listed Overseas"].
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a. Independence Requirements
An "independent director" is defined as someone who is not a
shareholder, and does not hold a position in the company. The term
"outside director" is not defined.216
b. Powers of Independent Directors
The SET/CSRC Opinions further request that any transactions
between a company and its affiliates have to be approved by the
independent directors before this transaction becomes effective.27
Additionally, the SET/CSRC Opinions grant independent directors
the power to report relevant situations directly to the company's
shareholders' meetings and the CRSC.
28
i Draft Rules for Companies Seeking Listing on a Secondary
Board (Gongsi Erban Shangshi Guize Caoan)
A draft set of rules for companies looking for listing on a
secondary board (operating and defined as "NASDAQ") were
reported on August 23, 2000, in the People's Daily. The objective of
these rules is to regulate companies seeking to be listed on a
secondary board.
a. Independence Requirements
The draft rules provide a relatively clear description of the
qualifications of independent directors as people who were not (1)
shareholders 9; or (2) directly related, or collaterally related within
three kinship generations to company directors, supervisors, or
officers, (3) directors, supervisors, or officers of affiliated enterprises;
or (4) any person who was controlled the company.220 The draft rules
did not provide for any obligations directors other than to attend
216. Id. at § 6.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. This prohibition originated from the special needs of controlling shareholders
in family-controlled close corporations. Stroud v. Grace, 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 1588
(1991). (Unreported case)(The Delaware Chancery Court found that a corporate
charter prohibiting their independent directors holding their stocks to be unusual, but
not illegal.).
220. Wu Li, Erban Chou Jan Dongtai [Trends in the Establishment of the
Secondary Board Market], RENMIN RI BAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY] (P.R.C.), August 23,
2000, at 3 (translated by author).
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board meetings.
ii "Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in
China" (Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Fagui)
The CSRC and the State Economic and Trade Commission
jointly issued the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed
Companies in China" (Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Fagui)
("Code") in accordance with the basic requirements of CCL, Chinese
Securities Law, other relevant laws and regulations, and other
commonly accepted standards of internal corporate governance on
January 7, 2001. The Code is a supplemental explanation to the
existing law. It is formulated to encourage the healthy development
of the securities market in China.221
a. Independence Requirements
The Code attributes significant attention to the subject of
corporate directors. It indicates that independent directors, as well as
their major shareholders, should be independent from the listed
company, and that they may not hold any other position in the same
222
company.
b. Independent Directors on Audit Committee
The Code requires that the audit committee, the nomination
committee and the remuneration and appraisal committee be chaired
by independent directors, and that the majority of the members of
those committees be independent directors. It also requires that one
independent director of the audit committee be an accounting
professional.223
It is worthwhile to note that the Code imposes duties of good
faith and due diligence on independent directors. For instance, the
Code specifically requests independent directors to concern
221. Preface of Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China
(promulgated by CSRC and SETC, effective Jan.7, 2001), available at
[http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code-en.html].
222. See Id. at §49.
223. Id at §52.
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themselves with the interests of minority shareholders.224
iv. Draft Measures on the Administration of Securities
Companies, Draft for Comments "(Zhengquan Gongsi
Guanli Banfa "Zhengqiu Yiian Gao')"
The CSRC issued its proposed "Measures on the Administration
of Securities Companies" ("Draft Measures") for comment on June
20, 2001. The draft measures make a big improvement by introducing
a concrete independent director system.
a. Independence Requirements
This Draft Measures require that independent directors: (1) meet
the conditions stipulated in the Company Law225; (2) not be
employees of an entity which holds the company's shares; (3) not be
currently or in the last three years one of the company's employees;
(4) not have any relationship of interest with any of the company
directors, supervisors or senior managers or anyone who is liable for
financial audits in the company; (5) not be employees of any entity
which has significant relationship of interest with the company; (6)
have at least five years of professional experience in either finance,
law or accounting, and would be able to devote sufficient time and
energy to perform the directors' duties; and (7) meet other conditions
required by CSRC.
b. Independent Directors on the Board
For the minimum proportion requirement, the Draft Measures
require that independent directors constitute no less than one third of
the board if: (1) the chairman of the board and the CEO ("chief
executive officers") of the company are the same person; (2) internal
directors constitute at least one fifth of the board; (3) the company
has been sanctioned for unlawful activity or certain extraordinary
situations have occurred; (4) the reputation of the company is
seriously deficient so that the interests of clients and shareholders
may be affected; or (5) the department in charge of the company, its
shareholders' general meeting or the CSRC deems it necessary.
224. Id. at §50.
225. See Articles 57-58 of the CCL.
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c. Powers and Responsibilities of Independent Directors
The Draft Measures require the approval of a majority of the
independent directors for the following matters: (1) matters relating
to audits; (2) transactions with affiliates, loan guarantees, and
admissions of security interests when borrowing; (3) hiring and firing
senior officers; (4) salaries and other types of compensations for
directors or senior officers; (5) the engagement or replacement of the
company's accounting firm; (6) other matters contained in the
company's articles of association; and (7) other matters required by
CSRC.
v. Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the
Board of Directors of Listed Companies (Guanyu Zai
Shangshi Gongsi Jianli Duli Dongshi Zhidu de Zhidao
Yijian)
Following the issuance of the experimental practices detailed
above the CSRC issued its "Guidelines for Introducing Independent
Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies" [(Guanyu
Zai Shangshi Gongsi Jianli Duli Dongshi Zhidu de Zhidao Yijian) on
August 16, 2001. This document is the most comprehensive Chinese
regulatory measures insofar as the regulation of independent
corporate directors
a. Independence Requirements
The CSRC Guideline Opinion declared that an independent
director shall not be: (1) a person who holds a position in the listed
company or its subordinate affiliates, or his or her direct relatives or
major special relatives (direct relatives refer to spouse, parents, or
children; major special relatives refer to siblings, parent-in-law,
daughter-in-law, son-in-law, and so on); (2) a person directly or
indirectly holding at least 1% of the outstanding shares of the listed
company or being among one of the top ten shareholders of the said
listed company, or this person's direct relatives; (3) a person who
works under the employment of a legal person shareholder who holds
at least 5% of the outstanding shares of the listed company or who is
among one of the top five shareholders, or this person's direct
relative; (4) a person who has fulfilled one of the above conditions in
the immediate last year; (5) a person who provides financial, legal,
consulting or other similar services to the listed company or its
subordinate enterprises; (6) any other person who has been specified
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in the listed company's articles of association; (7) any other person
who has been identified by the CSRC.1
26
The CSRC imposes a strict definition on "independence,"
limiting qualified "independent directors" to those who are free of
conflicts of interest in carrying out their supervisory functions.
b. Professional Qualifications
Independent directors have to fulfill the professional
qualification background requirement in addition to the
independence requirement. The professional requirements are as
follows: (1) director qualifications in line with relevant provisions of
law and administrative rules; (2) independence to meet the provisions
of this Guideline Opinion itself27; (3) possession of basic knowledge
of the operations of listed companies and familiarity with relevant
laws, administrative rules and other rules and regulations; (4) at least
five years' work experience in dealing with legal, economic, or other
necessary background, for his or her exercise of the power of an
independent director; and (5) possession of other qualifications that
the company's articles of association have specified.228
c. Powers and Responsibilities of Independent Directors
Independent directors have the following responsibilities: (1)
approval of significant dealings with affiliates (quanlian ren) where
the venture amount is more than RMB3 million or more than 5% of
the net asset value of the company in accordance with the its most
recent audit report; (2) advising on hiring and firing the company's
accounting firm; (3) proposing to convene interim shareholders'
meeting and board meetings; (5) engaging outside auditors and
consultants; and (6) soliciting proxies before a shareholders' meeting.
All of the above powers may only be exercised while receiving
consent from more than half independent directors.
Similar to the "Code of Corporate Governance for Listed
226. Guanyu Zai Shangshi Gongsi Jianli Duli Dongshi Zhidu de Zhidao Yijian
[Guideline Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent Director System in
Listed Companies] (promulgated by CSRC, on Aug. 16, 2001, effective on Aug.
21,2001), §3, available at <http://211.154.210.238/en/depjsp/depsecond en.jsp> (search
for Departments; then follow to Department of Listed Company Supervision Service
Guide).
227. Id. at § 1(2).
228. Id. at § 2.
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Companies in China," the Guideline Opinion provides that
independent directors shall bear the duties of good faith (chengxin)
and due diligence (qinmian) toward the company as well as the entire
body of shareholders, and that they specifically concern themselves
with minority shareholder interests.229
d. Independent Directors on the Board
Listed companies were required by the Guideline Opinion to
have at least two independent directors by June 30, 2002, and that the
independent directors should constitute at least one third of the board
by June 30, 2003.' Moreover, the above requirement must be
included in the listed companies' articles of association.
e. Independent Directors on Audit Committee
The Guideline Opinion also requires that more than half of the
members of the audit committee, the nomination committee, as well
as the compensation committee of the board, be independent
directors.
E. Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi Zhiii Zhuanze (Principles of
Corporate Governance for Chinese Listed Companies)
The CSRC released a draft of its "Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi
Zhili Zhuanze" ("Principles of Corporate Governance for Chinese
Listed Companies") 3' for comments on September 11, 2001. These
Principles are based on the OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance, and were revised by proper principles drawn from
specific foreign jurisdictions and China's own domestic consideration.
i. Independence Requirements
An independent director may not have any position other than
his or her position of independent director of the company. Likewise,
an independent director may not have a relationship with the
229. Id. at Article 1 § 2.
230. Id. at Article 3 § 1.
231. This document referred to another two announcements: CSRC
announcement, on April 2001, concerning , Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi Zhili de
Jiben Yuanze he ShuiZhun (Basic Principles and Standards for the Corporate
Governance Structure of Listed Companies in China), and CSRC announcement on
May 21 2001, concerning the impending promulgation of Shangshi Gongsi Zhili
Zhiyin (Guidelines for the Governance of Listed Companies).
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company, or its controlling shareholders, which might interfere with
his or her independent judgment.32
a. Independent Directors on the Board
The principles stipulate that at least half of the directors should
be independent if the chairman of the board of directors is also the
CEO .233
b. Independent Directors on Audit Committee
For the compensation and assessment committees of the board,
independent directors are suggested to constitute a majority, and the
chairman of this committee must also be an independent director. As
to the audit committee of the board, the principles require at least
one member to be an independent director who must be an
accountant.
F Principles on Securities Companies' Governance (Trial)
Zhengquan Gongsi Zhili Zhunmzi (Shixing)
In order to accomplish better corporate governance, standardize
the operation of securities companies and the modern enterprise
system, the CSRC announced a trial version of "Zhengquan Gongsi
Zhili Zhunzi"("Principles on Securities Companies' Governance") on
December 15, 2003. These Principles were drafted in accordance with
cCCL, sSecurities Law as well as other administrative laws and
regulations for the purpose of protecting the legal interests of
shareholders, clients and all the involved parties related to securities
234companies.
i. Independence Requirements
The following people are not allowed to be independent
directors: (1) employees of the securities companies or other related
companies or the employees' direct relatives or major social
relatives;(2) employees of shareholders holding more than a 5%
shareholding or among the top 5 shareholding or the employees'
232. Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhuanze [Principles of Corporate
Governance for Chinese Listed Companies], at Art. 33.
233. Id. at Art. 32.
234. According to Article 1 of "Zhengquan Gongsi Zhili Zhunzi (Shixing)"
("Principles on Securities Companies' Governance (Trial)").
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direct relatives or major social relatives; (3) natural person
shareholders holding more than a 5% shareholding or their direct
relatives or major social relatives; (4) people who provide financial,
legal consulting services to the securities companies or other relevant
parties or their direct or major relatives ; (5) anyone who fulfills one
of the above-mentioned conditions within the most recent one year;
(6) directors in other securities companies; (7) other people
prohibited in accordance with the articles of association; and (8) other
people prohibited by the CSRC. 5 In addition to the independence
requirement, these principles require that independent directors have
a basic knowledge of securities markets as well as the relevant law
and administrative regulations. Independent directors should also
have at least five-years of work experience and be people of high
integrity. 36
a. Independent Directors on Audit Committee
These principles require the board of directors to set up special
committees for reviewing relevant dealings, compensation for high-
level managers.237 The coordinators of those committees have to be
independent directors. 8
b. Powers and Responsibilities of Independent Directors
Independent directors can: (1) propose that the board of
directors or board of supervisors convene provisional shareholders'
meetings and board meetings; (2) hire professional auditing
institutions or consulting institutions based on the needs of their
responsibilities; (3) provide independent opinions on the
compensation plan and encouragement plan of directors and
managers and other matters; and (4) provide independent opinions
on major business transactions.
Independent directors should submit work reports in
shareholders' annual meetings and are liable if they fail to fulfill their
responsibilities.
235. Id. at Art. 39.
236. Id
237. Id. at Art. 62.
238. Id. at Art. 42.
239. Id.
240. Id. at Article 42
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G. Zhengquan Gongsi Nabu Kongzhi Zhiyin (Guidelines for
Internal Controls for Securities Companies)
The CSRC issued a set of rules providing guidelines for the
internal governance for securities companies on January 31, 2001.
However, those Guidelines were annulled, and a new version of the
guidelines, issued under the same name, came into effect on
Decemeber 26, 2003. Similarly to the former guidelines, the amended
version merely reiterates the demand for independent directors to
"bring into full play the monitoring function of independent directors,
in order to prevent manipulation by the controlling shareholders.,
21 1
H. Guanyu Jiaqiang Shehui Gongzhonggu Gudong Quanyi
Baohui de Ruogan Guiding (Several Rules Regarding
Strengthening Protection of Societal Public Shareholders'
Rights)
The Rules Regarding Strengthening Protection of Societal Public
Shareholders' Rights (hereinafter "Rules") were proposed by the
State Council on December 7, 2004 in response to the reorganization
and stabilization of the capital market in China.242
The Rules dedicate a section to the institution and the operation
of the independent director system. The Rules do not specifically
stipulate the qualifications or proportion of independent directors;
they merely state the independent discretion and expected powers
and duties borne by independent directors and emphasize their
obligations to minority public shareholders.243
i. Powers and Responsibilities of Independent Directors
Major business decisions and the hiring and firing of public
accounting firms, requires the agreement of half of the independent
241. See Zhengquan Gongsi Nabu Kongzhi Zhiyin (Guidelines for Internal
Controls for Securities Companies) (promulgated by CSRC, Jan. 31, 2001, new
version in effect Dec. 26, 2003), Art. 11. (translation by author).
242. These Rules were issued to further pursue the "Guowuyuan Guanyu Tuidong
Ziben Shichang GGGaige Kaifang he Wending Fazhan de Ruogan Yijian" ("Several
Opinions Regarding How the State Council Promotes Revolution of the Capital
Market and its Stable Development"), especially to protect the society public
shareholders' rights (author's translation).
243. See Guanyu Jiaqiang Shehui Gongzhonggu Gudong Quanyi Baohui de
Ruogan Guiding [Several Rules Regarding Strengthening Protection of Society
Public Shareholders' Rights] arts. 1-2, § 2 (promulgated by CSRC) (Chi-Wei Huang
trans.) (translation on file with author).
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directors.2" Additionally, independent directors are required to
attend meetings of the board of directors in order to understand the
operation of the company."' Independent directors also have to
submit annual reports to shareholders' meetings."6 Notably, the
Rules protect the full term of independent directors' positions unless
there exist proper supporting reasons. 7
I Implementation of Independent Director System in China
China has proclaimed numerous rules to encourage companies to
install independent director systems to better protect minority
shareholders' rights and to attract more foreign investment. A
random survey held in Hunan Province in 2004 researched the
effectiveness of independent director systems. This survey took
twenty-two listed companies as its research subject and found all of
them have installed the independent director system. 8 According to
the survey, 13 companies had more than one third of board occupied
by independent directors. The independent directors hired by those
twenty-two companies are usually highly educated - 53.6% held
doctorate degrees and 88.4% held other high-level educational
titles.24 9 Seventy-seven percent of the subject companies believe that
the importation of the independent director system has greatly
improved the company's decision-making ability. However, seventy
five percent of the companies believed that the independent director
system did not offer significant help in balancing controlling
shareholders' powers and preventing their undue influence on
executive directors250 This survey signals that the implementation of
the independent director system in China has obtained moderate
positive results.
Although the independent directors system is being implemented
in China, the original organizational structures and the entrenched
"rule of man" culture of China's corporate economy, will certainly
244. Seeid. Art. 3, § 2.
245. See id. Art. 2 § 5.
246. See id. Art. 5, § 2.
247. See id. Art. 6, § 2.
248. The State Ouo and Resolution of Independent Director System in Listed
Companies, Quan Jing Wang (Full View Net), December 10, 2004.
249. ld. at 2.
250. Id.
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hinder the efficacy of this foreign system." Overall, the pursuit of the
independent director system has not been successful, due in part to
these path dependency concerns.
V. Path Dependency - Obstacles to Worldwide Corporate
Governance Convergence in China and Suggestive
Solutions
While there are numerous rules, regulations, and guidelines
emphasizing the importance and significance of independent director
system, something crucial had been lost on China in its importation of
the system.
A. Absence of Audit Committees
212According to a 2000 report by the Shanghai Stock Exchange,
around 5.4% of its listed companies had installed professional sub-
committees. The most common one is the investment and fund-
circulation committee, followed by the "audit committee," the
"financial management committee" and the "strategy committee."
Among all those committees, the strategy committee and the
corporate nature revolutionary committee requires the highest
proportion of independent directors.
One can note from the above listed rules and regulations
concerning the establishment of the independent director system that,
the "audit committee" is not a widespread institution in Chinese
corporate governance. In contrast, almost every set of rules in the
United States repeatedly mention the significance of the audit
committee and its indispensable function of the independent director
system. The principles and regulations of the ALI, the NYSE, the
NASDAQ as well as the SOX all require publicly-held companies
and listed companies to have audit committees. In the United States,
these audit committees in the implement and support the oversight
function of the board by reviewing companies' financial data, their
internal controls, and the independence of the corporation's external
251. PEERENBOOM, supra note 55, at 17.
252. Refer to "The Result and Analysis of Questionnaires on Chinese Listed
Company Corporate Governance", an attachment from "Corporate Governance:
International Experience and the Chinese Practice" released at "International
Conference on Chinese Listed Companies" held by Shanghai Stock Exchange, Nov.
2-3, 2000 (translation by author).
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auditors on a periodic basis. 3
In China as well, independent directors are charged with
overseeing financial and accounting matters. However, it is difficult
for those independent directors to perform these functions with much
personal discretion. The main problems are that Chinese corporate
governance does not require companies to have audit committees and
further, it does not require audit committees to be made up "solely"
of independent directors. Therefore, the leverage of independent
directors is easily diminished as they can, at most, represent one-third
of the board.254 Additionally, the path dependency described herein is
due to rent-protection concerns. Most high-level executives are also
officials of government agencies, incumbent management groups are
not ready to subordinate their political clout to independent parties.255
The path dependency we perceive here may come from rent-
protection concerns. Since most high-level executives are officials
from government agencies, these incumbent management groups do
seem to be ready to give up their controlling powers to independent
256parties.
Chinese regulators should encourage their listed companies to
operate several different professional committees, especially audit
committees. In addition, the audit committee should be composed of
at least a majority of independent directors. The audit committees
will not only need to participate in companies' financial and
accounting affairs, they also have to review potential conflict-of-
interest situations on an ongoing basis.
The Chinese regulators are suggested to promote the installation
of audit committee on a function level rather than formal level before
253. See e.g., Art. 303A.07(c)(i) of New York Stock Exchange, Listed Company
Manual available at <http://www.nyse.com/regulationlisted/1182508124422.html>,
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 3.05(d) (2005).
254. See generally Guideline Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent
Director System in Listed Companies; "Draft Measures on the Administration of
Securities Companies, Draft for Comments" and "Guidelines for Introducing
Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies."
255. Huanghe Shijian Baodao [Reports on Yang-Tze Rivet, ZHENGQUAN SHIBAO
[SEC. TIMES], Jan. 14, 2000 (reporting on how powerless independent directors had
become, and their decisions to quit while the chairman of the board and general
manager fight over powers) (Chi-Wei Huang trans.) (translation on file with author).
256. Zhengquan Shibao, Huanghe Shijian Baodao [Reports on Yang-Tze Riveij,
Security Times, Jan. 14, 2000 (reporting on how powerless independent directors had
become, and their decisions to quit while the chairman of the board and general
manager fight over powers) translated by author.
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the market participants get familiar with the its mechanism. If either
formal or functional changes are thwarted by path dependencies, a
firm may opt for private ordering to amend its articles of
incorporation to install audit commit, or to list on a domestic
securities market or cross list on a foreign securities market which
require the adoption of audit committee. While most of the high level
executives realize the existence of audit committees will not
expropriate their interests but enhance the overall company interests,
they will voluntarily appreciate this system.
B. Absence of a Definite Boundary between Independent
Director System and Supervisory Board
The original CCL was derived from continental legal systems'
two tier structure."7 It adopted an independent supervisory board,
which inspects the company operations and investigates financial
performance."' In China, both the board of directors and supervisory
board are elected by the shareholders and, the board of directors is
supervised by the supervisory board.
In 1997, China imported the independent director system from
Anglo-American corporate law. Under this approach, the
supervisory board is, at least theoretically, in a position to fight for
stakeholder interests; whereas, and the independent directors
represent minority shareholders.259 Article 52 and Article 118 of CCL
stipulate that every limited company, and every company limited by
shares, shall set up a supervisory board consisting of at least three
members. This supervisory board shall include shareholders'
representatives and an appropriate proportion of employees'
representatives. A supervisor shall not simultaneously act as director
or high-level manager concurrently.2 ° Under the chapter for limited
companies, the supervisory board bears the following powers: (1) to
inspect the company's financial status; (2) to supervise directors' or
high-level managers' conduct in their capacity to submit recall
257. Corporate Governance in Europe: Report of a CEPS Working Party, 1995
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES 12, 17 (BeIg.).
258. Gu, supra note 81.
259. CSRC's "Guanyu Jiaqiang Shehui Gongzhonggu Gudong Quanyi Baohui de
Ruogan Guiding" ( "Several Rules Regarding Strengthening Protection of Society
Public Shareholders' Rights")(author's translation). Stakeholders include any party
involving with the company such as employees, debtors, customers and so on.
Shareholders refer to those who hold the company shares.
260. Article 52 of CCL.
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proposals against directors or high-level managers if there are
violations of any law, any administrative regulations, the company's
articles of association or the resolutions of shareholders' meetings; (3)
to request directors or high-level managers to rectify any of their
conduct that may cause prejudice to the company; (4) to propose to
convene interim shareholders' meeting, to convene and preside over
shareholders' meeting when the board of directors refuse to convene
and preside over shareholders' meeting; (5) to submit proposals to
shareholders' meetings; (6) to initiate law suits against directors and
high-level managers according to Article 152 of this Law; and (7) to
exercise other rights as stipulated in the said company's articles of
association.26' Article 55 and Article 119 of the CCL also grant
supervisors the power to attend the meeting of board of directors as
non-voting delegates and to hire accounting firms to assist in
oversight at the company's expense.
According to the "Guidelines for Introducing Independent
Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies," strict
restrictions regarding independence requirements are imposed on
independent directors.262  This Guideline Opinion also request
independent directors to fulfill certain professional qualifications such
as backgrounds in law and economics.263  The functions of
independent directors focus on overseeing a company's financial
situation,26 these functions overlap the responsibilities of the
supervisory board.
Under the current CCL, independent directors are to supervise
the behaviors of internal directors' executive and implementational
duties, and the supervisory board is to oversee both independent
directors' and internal directors' performance. The supervisors
apparently hold higher supervisory power than independent directors
since they hold the power to supervise the directors themselves and
they have state authorization to inspect certain company matters.
However, the independence and professional qualifications
requirements for independent directors, set out in the "Guideline
Opinion," are much stricter than what is required of supervisors
under the CCL.
There exist sweeping criticisms of the co-existence of the
261. Article 54 and Article 119 of the CCL.
262. See supra note 226 at § 3.
263. Id. at §2.4.
264. Id. at §1.2.
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supervisory board and independent director system.265 Some scholars
question the necessity of independent directors, suggesting instead
that the supervisory function of the supervisory board ought to be
strengthened.26  Others suggest the Chinese government should
simply eliminate the supervisory board all together,267 thereby moving
one step further from the civil law system (focus on stakeholders'
interests) toward a common law system (focus on shareholders'
interests).
No matter what Chinese regulators propose, they surely would
encounter the obstacles of rent-protection and inefficiency.
Resistance may come from incumbent supervisors who are not willing
to give up or share their long-standing powers of the corporate
system. Additionally, the uncertainty and the costs associated with
restructuring the current system may well outweigh the efficiency of a
new system.
Since China is in the early stage of adopting the independent
director system, China should carefully monitor particular application
of this system to its own corporate governance. The convergence
toward a global standard should take place on a function level.
Individual firms interested in transplanting the independent director
system must make incumbent supervisors understand that these
changes will not take negatively impact their interests, but benefit the
firm's overall performance. If the Chinese government is serious
about replacing the supervisory board with independent director
system, it should also consider transplanting the U.S. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board" (hereinafter "PCAOB"). 268 The SOX
265. Mingkang Gu, Will an Independent Director Perform Better Than a
Supervisor? Comments on the Newly Created Independent Director System in the
People's Republic of China, 6 J. Chinese and Comparative Law 59, 74 (2003)
(arguing the necessity of an independent director system, emphasize the importance
of strengthen the supervisory function of the supervisory board).
266. Chaobing Xie, Research on Independent Directors Legal Institutions,
August, 2004, at 466; Ouyang Fan, Discussion on Comparison Between Independent
Directors and Supervisory Board, 8 Modern Management Science (2003); Feng, Guo,
Discussion on the Accomplishment and Innovation of Corporate Governance
Structure, China Securities News, Jan. 10, 2000.
267. Id., at 466; Li Yu and Jun Fong, A New Thought on Resolution of China's
State Owned Enterprises and Corporate Governance Structure, Corporate
Governance Structure: China's Practice and the U.S.' Experience, China People's
University Publisher (2000), at 159.
268. Lawrence A. Cunningham, A New Product for the State Corporation Law
Market: Audit Committee Certifications, 1 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 327, 331 (2004)
(quoting "PCAOB adopted Auditing Standard No. 2 to require external auditors to
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has created the PCAOB to oversee the effectiveness of those audit
committees. The PCAOB, operating as a not for profit organization,
infuses justifiable confidence into the efficacy of audit committee
practices.269
C. Lack of Effective Enforcement Authority for CSRC
Similar to the SEC in the United States, the CSRC in China
oversees key participants in the securities world, including but not
limited to the two stock exchanges, broker-dealers and investment
advisors.27° The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges are self-
regulatory bodies subordinated to the CSRC. However, in contrast to
the SEC, which is a government agency charged with regulating the
securities market, the CSRC does not have independent regulatory
powers. According to articles 179 and 180 of PRC's Securities Law,
the Securities Regulatory Organization has the duties and powers to
supervise and manage the regulation of securities markets, and listed
companies. Although this would make it seem that the CSRC is
vested with great power, it functions under the direct supervision of
the Chinese State Council. In effect this regulatory paradox makes
protecting investor rights and regulating the market according to the
state's macro-economic control a struggle for the CSRC. When
shareholder interests conflict with that of the government's socialist
market economy policy, the CSRC will inevitably pursue the state's
commands. In this way, and much to shareholder disappointment,
the CSRC is not able maintain its independent judgment. It is
therefore an unlikely candidate for the effective investigation of
misconduct. As a result, a very limited number of disciplinary actions
are taken against independent directors and corporations in China.
evaluate and the effectiveness of the audit committee's oversight of a corporation's
financial reporting and related internal control. This evaluation will be part of the
auditor's new task, under Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, of attesting to managerial
assertions concerning the effectiveness of internal control. When Auditing Standard
No. 2 was released for public comment as a proposed standard, the proposal
appeared to require a separate and complete evaluation"); see also section 101(a) of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
269. Cunningham, supra note 265, at 330; see also section 101(a) of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002.
270. See Articles 178-180 of the PRC Securities Law.
271. Y. Wei, Duli DongshiBeiFfa Di Yi An[The first case for an independent
director being fined], Zhongguo Lushi Wang [Chinese Lawyer Net], Dec 13, 2002,
available at http://www.chineselawyer.com.cn/article/200212135599.html (introducing
the case of an unfortunate tale of Lu Jiahao).
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It has taken China several decades to establish two functional
stock exchanges and a central securities regulatory government
agency. To have the CSRC become a totally independent authority
does not seem to be on the agenda in this wave of economic reform;
this would be very costly, and of course, the state is hardly likely to
give up its control. This aspect of the actual enforcement authority of
the CSRC will certainly delay China's move toward the shareholder-
oriented/dispersed ownership model.
In order to establish a healthy shareholder-oriented model to
attract more investment, China needs to formally have its CSRC
become totally independent of the state and to have its own
enforcement without government intervention. A civil enforcement
like in the U.S. corporate governance system needs to be
accompanied with an independent body. In the United States, the
SEC brings between 400-500 civil enforcement actions against
individuals and companies that break the securities laws each year.272
Typical breaches include insider trading, accounting or financial
frauds, and false or misleading information supplied about securities
and the companies that issue them.273
D. Lack of True Independence
Much of the literature on the topic of corporate governance
agrees that independent directors are not able to protect minority
shareholder interests274 effectively because independent directors are
nominated by the controlling shareholders. Chinese regulators face a
dilemma: if they give any shareholder the independent director
nomination right without a minimum requirement of shareholdings,
then a profusion of nominated candidates could give excessive power
to controlling shareholders through a scattering of the votes of small
shareholders; however, if they demand a minimum requirement of
shareholding to the nomination right then most of the nomination
rights will be held by those controlling shareholders.. The CSRC
initially requested a 5% minimum shareholder requirement for
nominations275 rights according to Section 4 of the "Guidelines for
272. See <http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml> ("Introduction of SEC").
273. Id.
274. See supra note 125.
275. According to Section 4 of the Guanyu Zai Shangsi Gongshi Zhidu de Zhidao
Yijian (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) [Guideline Opinion on the Establishment of an
Independent Director System in Listed Companies (Draft for Comments)].
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Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of
Listed Companies". (Draft for Comments)]. However, it later
lowered the threshold to 1% in the final version of [Guideline
Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent Director System in
Listed Companies]. Nevertheless, it is still difficult for minority
shareholders to elect someone to represent their voices since the
nomination procedure hardly protects minority shareholders' rights.
Controlling shareholders still nominate most of the candidates and
minority shareholders have very few possibilities to vote for their
preferred candidates, even though "the cumulative voting" is
encouraged by the Corporate Governance Principles. 6
Independent directors may have already disappointed people's
high expectations. It is inevitable that independent directors selected
through the defective, and biased selection process could hardly play
the role of an independent third party to watch and supervise the
operation of a company, nor are they able to voice the minority
shareholders' concerns. They will very likely represent those who
select them for the board, i.e., the controlling shareholders. To
change, incumbent controlling shareholders need to be willing to give
up their significant leverage The concerns for "efficiency" and "rent
protection" path dependency will certainly be significant in the
adoption of a new system. While the Rules and Opinions do not have
enforcement power, those firms that recognize the importance of
"true independence" to amend its articles of incorporation or list on a
securities market will adopt a selection system promoting true
independence of independent directors.
E. Lack of Enforcement Power of Rules and Opinions
Chinese regulators have determined to institute the independent
directors system in their current corporate governance model.
However, as suggested by their titles - "Opinions," "Rules,"
"Guidelines," "Measures," etc. - it is unlikely that this profusion of
instruments will be as strictly enforced as those which have been
enacted into law by the State Council. This is different from the U.S.
practice in which Congress signed SOX into law. Those "Rules,"
"Opinions" or others are not strictly mandatory legislation, even
though those public listed companies are "encouraged" but not
"required" to implement it. No apparent sanctions have been
276. See supra note 232, at Art. 29.
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suggested in any of the above documents for a company's failure to
comply with the provisions requiring them to institute the
independent director system.2 7'
Changes in China were initiated primarily top-down, brought
about by government policies. The greater scope of market-oriented
transactions those government policies promoted, the more formal
law was needed.278 China is in the initial stage of development of the
independent director system. It is understandable that the Chinese
government needs more time to observe the operation of this system.
Nonetheless, China has to realize that while a high-level of certainty
is provided by its government policy and bureaucratic guidance, the
world demands to a higher-level of certainty, such as that which could
be provided by a set of well-defined enforceable rules and regulatory
institutions.279 To have the formal laws rather than rules, measures or
guidelines regarding installation of independent director system
enacted duly needs great determination from the Chinese central
government. Maybe the government will encounter the crisis of
inefficiency or rent protection for a short-term prospect. However, an
accomplished formal legal system with a better supervisory system
will surely bring in stable foreign investment in the long run.
F Other Problems
i. Shortage of Qualified Independent Directors
According to section 1(3) of the Independent Director Opinion,
listed companies should have at least two independent directors by
June 30, 2002, and such directors should constitute at least one third
of the board by June 30, 2003.2" Among those independent directors,
at least one of them must specialize in accounting. Most of the
Independent Directors in China are selected from the pools of either
public figures such as well-known economists and governmental
officials" or academic professionals. A 2001 survey by the
277. Id. at note 8, §21.
278. Katharina Pistor & Philip A. Wellons, The Role of Law and Legal
Institutions in Asian Economic Development 1960-1995 (1999).
279. Id.
280. According to Article 109 of Company Law, stock companies should have five
to nineteen directors.
281. These people are selected for the purpose of increasing the reputation of
enterprises.
282. These people are selected for the purpose of providing professional opinions
20081
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Shanghai Securities Exchange showed that only 0.3% of directors
interviewed could be categorized as "independent"' and other
institutions claimed that only 314 eligible independent directors
existed in the whole country. 4 A 2002 survey on the number and
background of 1,100 listed companies reported that 274 companies
have retained total of 511 independent directors or independent
director candidates. Of those, 183 independent directors are college
graduates, 108 of them hold a master degree, and 142 of them hold a
Ph.D. degree. Although the credentials of most nominated
independent directors seem to be very strong, only one-fifth of them
have accounting background. It is apparent that only very few of the
independent directors fulfill the CSRC's requirements. 8 ' The
shortage of qualified candidates provides another reason why the
same person may serve as "independent" director of several different
companies. Given this reality, the quality of supervision and
consultation offered by such persons, must surely decline.
VI. Conclusion
While Western capitalism is said to have its basis in the "rule of
law," the developing Chinese bureaucratic capitalism,8 characterized
as free market under central command, is based on "rule of man."
Although there have been widespread arguments that the rule of law
is conducive to economic growth, this assumption is challenged by
China's recent prodigious economic achievements.2" Opponents of
the theory of global convergence of corporate governance disagree
that all corporate governance regimes around the globe are
converging toward a single system, described above. They further
to companies.
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disagree on the existence of a global convergence. China may be an
exception since its current economic achievements apparently do not
result from the certainty brought by a clear and definite legal system,
but from the centrally planned commands of an autonomousgovernment. 2 9
Is China moving toward shareholder-oriented and dispersed
ownership model? Yes, convincing evidence indicates that China is
indeed moving toward shareholder-oriented and dispersed ownership
model regardless of how its economic developments have occurred in
the past couple of decades. The establishment of the 1994 CCL
indicated China's determination to embrace a shareholder-oriented
model. The 2006 CCL amendment and the installation of legal
institutions regarding independent directors affirmed that China had
already started its transition to a shareholder-oriented model of
corporate governance and a dispersed-ownership system. Although
market participants and government regulators are still struggling
with efficiency or rent protection path dependencies and other
problems, there are strong indicia that China is indeed moving toward
a shareholder-oriented model/dispersed-ownership corporate
governance structure. Despite this progress, China's "rule of man"
path-developing process has made path dependency problems much
harder to overcome than other "rule of law" countries. "Chinese
bureaucratic capitalism" has been using "clientelism" and
"corporatism" as available options or partial substitutes for "rule of
law."
290
"Clientelism" refers to a close-knitted society in which personal
and social networks (also known as guanxi in Chinese) are highly
regarded. Horizontal clientelism consists of relationships among
equal interest groups. Vertical clientelism, to some extent, advocates
a relationship between superiors and subordinates such as
government agencies and private entities.29' This phenomenon has
gradually deepened the ultimate influence of the persons in power
and further strengthened the power of "rent-protection" path
dependency.
Corporatism has been asserted as a middle ground between
Liberalism and Marxism. 22 Liberalism promotes a state of weak
289. Shanghai Stock Exchange Brief Introduction, supra note 198.
290. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 287, at 466.
291. Id. at 470.
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government authority with strong self-regulatory private interest
groups; whereas Marxism advocates a state of totalitarian or at least
authoritarian with weak self-regulatory private interest groups.
Corporatism is characterized by a strong central government
authority with some private interest groups existing and enjoying a
certain degree of autonomy.293 With a tradition of being a centralized,
authoritarian country, the People's Republic of China survives by
maintaining an accomplished hierarchical system, which can also be
traced to the influence of Confucianism.2" This single value system
has made the efficiency-driven path dependency even harder to
overcome.
In China, "business is subordinate to and depends heavily on ties
with the techno-bureaucracy to accomplish its (overall) goal".9 The
strong ties of clientelism and corporatism produce an active and
highly concentrated ownership structure in the newly developed
shareholding system. The majority of the ownership in Chinese stock
markets has traditionally been controlled by the State. Businessmen
have to network, socially and professionally, in a highly concentrated
ownership structure to enhance their business profits. The domestic
market, which for a long time was dominated by government's
discretionary black-box manipulation dealings and close-knit social
network, has been challenged as China has opened their door to
attract more foreign investment.2" China has tried to corporatize
SOEs to reduce the power-abusing opportunities of government
officials,2  has stipulated numerous rules and regulations to
standardize the corporatization of their SOEs, has amended their
national company law, and has set up an independent director system
in order to protect minority shareholders' rights. Nevertheless, the
obstacles caused by path dependency hinder their convergence
toward the worldwide corporate governance standard.
Although the Chinese government has encountered significant
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path dependencies while transplanting various business laws and
regulations, it firmly believes "rule of law" is the ground for economic
growth.298 It also believes that accountability will enable China to
pursue economic development without democracy.29 For China, a
legal structure is a substitute of democracy. ° However, the Chinese
government holds a monopoly over law-making initiatives. The
government has generated relatively clear and defined formal rules
(constitutions, laws and rules) and informal constraints (norms,
conventions and codes of conduct)., However, an effective
enforcement mechanism is needed in addition to rules and codes in
order to ensure an effective legal system in practice not merely in
theory." Reduction of the influence of path dependency in a "rule of
man" market is China's toughest task.
If we apply the theory discussed in Part I to the current situation
in China, the government first must address and resolve the current
problems at a functional level rather than a formal, legalistic level.
Instead of "whole-set" transplantation of legal protections for
minority shareholders from Western corporate governance model,
the Chinese government or individual private firms may evolve a
synonymous functional mechanism around its existing institutions at
this early transformation stage. While the Chinese regulators
formally enacted a company law which included some protective
measures for minority shareholders, the legal measures with respect
to independent directors are merely informally installed as guidelines,
rules or measures rather than formally and functionally implemented.
The Chinese government should strengthen the concept of
independence of independent director so as to instill the concept of
separation of supervision from management into the minds of market
participants. The Chinese people need to be actively trained in
effective corporate governance to counter the tradition of
government by a collective value system, whether in the form of one
big family in ancient time, or by the State in the present day.
One the other hand, regulators must assure the controlling group
that: (1) the independent director system will increase their wealth,
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and the increase will be greater than the loss of their private benefit
of control; and (2) their private rights will not be expropriated after
the installation of developed corporate governance system. To move
toward shareholder-oriented/dispersed-ownership model and
strengthen the practice of independent director system, China needs
to gradually change to a softer, societal version of corporatism,'
which will allow private interest groups more self-regulation under a
clear rule of law structure.
302. See supra note 55.
[Vol. 31:1
